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Climate Variability is defined as variations in the mean state and other statistics of the climate on all 
temporal and spatial scales, beyond individual weather events. The term "Climate Variability" is often used 
to denote deviations of climatic statistics over a given period of time (e.g. a month, season or year) when 
compared to long-term statistics for the same calendar period. Climate variability is measured by these 
deviations, which are usually termed anomalies. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within 
the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external factors 
(external variability). (Extracted from https://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/ccl/faqs.php)  
Conflicts 
Conflicts are defined as any type of violence, conflict, tensions, and related socio-political co-variate 
insecurities affecting a group of individuals in certain geographical area. Empirically, we measure conflicts 
using the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. ACLED defined conflicts as political violence, which is “the 
use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation”, including battles, protests, 
explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and non-violent conflicts, called “strategic 
developments”, including looting/property destruction, disrupted weapon use, arrests, etc. (ACLED n.d.) 
Food and nutrition security  
Following the UN Committee on World Food Security, we define food security a situation in which “all 
people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that 
meets their food preferences and dietary needs for an active and healthy life.” Food security has four 
dimensions: availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic 
production or imports; access by households and individuals to adequate resources to acquire appropriate 
foods for a nutritious diet; utilization of food through adequate diet, water, sanitation, and health care; 
stability is about being food secure at all times (Extracted from Timmer, 2012). 
Climate security nexus (CS-nexus) 
Climate does not directly affect conflict and peace. Instead, it exacerbates existing risks and insecurities 
that can increase grievances and tensions and ultimately affect peace and insecurity in a given area, 
country, region, or continent. The climate security nexus describes these relationships and dynamics across 
three main systems: the ecological systems (including climate variability and natural resource access and 
quality), the economic system (including agricultural productivity, food and nutrition security, poverty, 
inequality, migration, etc.) and the socio-political systems (including social structures, identities, 











We live in a world of increasingly unpredictable, more frequent, and more extreme climate impacts, where 
the most vulnerable are also the most exposed to climate shocks and stressors and are less able to improve 
their resilience capacity against those. In conflict settings, the impact of climate on food security, poverty, 
inequality and other existing threats and vulnerabilities may push the poorest and the most vulnerable into 
a spiral of further risks, insecurities, and social exclusion. Similarly, in fragile contexts, additional 
deprivations generated by the inability of the poorest households to cope with the climate impacts, can 
significantly increase competition over essential resources and exacerbate grievances, tensions, and 
conflicts. Thus, acknowledging the role of climate on peace and security has become a priority for many 
national and international policy makers. 
The objective of this report is to present the results of the WFP – CGIAR project “Action on Climate Change 
and food security to improve the prospect for peace” started in October 2020. The project is part of 
thematic deep dive on climate change of the broader, multi-year SIPRI-WFP knowledge partnership on 
understanding WFP’s contributions to improving the prospects for peace. In this study, we investigate the 
climate-food security-conflict nexus in Ethiopia and the Central American Dry Corridor (CADC). Both 
Ethiopia and the CADC are hotspots of high climate variabilities, high political insecurity, and conflicts and 
widespread food and nutrition insecurities across their populations. Therefore, the main research 
questions that this study aims to answer for the CADC countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Honduras) and Ethiopia are:  
• Is climate exacerbating existing threats that could increase the risk of conflict in the CADC countries 
and in Ethiopia?  
• Do areas of high climate variability co-occur with high socio-political insecurity in the CADC 
countries and in Ethiopia? 
• How can WFP programming become more climate security sensitive? 
The results of this study are intended to inform WFP’s understanding of the climate and conflict nexus and 
support the organization in addressing these through future WFP’s Country Strategic Plans in the CADC and 
Ethiopia. In addition, this research fits into the wider WFP-SIPRI-CGIAR joint research framework whose 
objective is to qualify and quantify the climate security nexus and to assess if, and how, WFP’s programming 
is mitigating conflict risk, including both the challenge of conflict-sensitive programming and WFP’s role in 
longer-term peacebuilding efforts against the backdrop of negative climate trends1.  
 
1 The document “CGIAR Responses to WFP main comments” submitted to WFP on the 30th of April 2021 clearly 
describes the linkages between this study and the WFP-CGIAR-SIPRI research framework.  A summary of this 






The following paragraphs summarise the results of this study.  
Ethiopia 
• Is climate exacerbating existing threats that could increase the risk of conflict in Ethiopia?  
Climate exacerbates food insecurity and poverty that can lead to more frequent conflicts. With a high 
proportion of the Ethiopian population relying on rain fed agriculture and pastoralism, climate variability 
exacerbates existing household level insecurities that are correlated with a higher likelihood and intensity 
of conflict. Climate is a threat multiplier. Drought and high temperature extremes are the main drivers 
hindering crop and livestock productivity, increasing household level food and nutrition insecurity, poverty 
and inequality and decreasing agricultural employment, which in turn are correlated with a higher 
likelihood and intensity of conflicts. For example, we find that an increase of ten days in the year with high 
temperature (>37 degree Celsius) increases the number of food insecure households, on average, by 3% 
and that the increase of one food insecure household is correlated with a 3% increase of the likelihood of 
future conflicts at woreda level. Similarly, high temperatures are positively correlated with the number of 
poor people in the woreda and that an additional household falling into poverty is positively correlated 
with the likelihood of conflict (on average +2%) and insurgence of more battles (on average an increase by 
fifty of the number of poor households is correlated with an additional local battle) in the woreda.  
The impact of climate on food insecurity can cascade in multiple, wider security risks. Our analyses also 
show that the impact of the climate on food security and poverty will result in the increase of multiple 
additional socio-economic risks that are connected to food insecurity and poverty. Using network analysis 
we are able to show that that there exists a clear interconnection between several key socio-economic 
dimensions, climate and conflicts. Our findings show that the strongest nodes are between aridity 
(ecological system), food and nutrition insecurity, high population pressure, lack of education, agricultural 
productivity, number of people in a crisis and intensity (events and fatalities) and diversity (richness) of 
conflicts. This suggests that an increase exposure to climate impacts of a part of this system, such as food 
security and poverty, can generate in increasing risks and insecurities across multiple dimensions of the 
network, such as inequality, agricultural productivity, and crisis exposure.  
• Do areas of high climate variability co-occur with high socio-political insecurity in Ethiopia? 
Afar, Somali and Tigray regions are currently the most exposed to climate security risks. Climate security 
risks are not the same everywhere in Ethiopia. Using spatial analysis, we can identify hot spots of climate 
insecurities. In Ethiopia, areas where persistent dry-hot climate conditions, chronic food insecurity and 
different socio-economic vulnerabilities converge present a moderate to severe conflict incidence. These 
areas encompassed the woredas of Elidar, Dubti, Mile, and Afambo in the north-eastern part of the Afar 
region. In Somali, affected areas included the northern woredas of Ayisha and Shinile, eastern woredas of 
Danot, Warder, Shilabo, Kebridehar, Denan, Shekosh, Gunagado, Aware, and Gashamo, and southern 
woredas of Dolo Odo, Filtu, and Moyale. Additional climate-security hotspots include border regions with 
Eritrea in the woredas of Gulomekeda and Erob in the Tigray region. In addition, for the period 1980 – 2020, 
there exist a number of hotspots where harsh climate conditions and conflicts co-occurred with other 
insecurities, such as high prevalence of malnourished children, low education levels, and low agricultural 
productivity. These hotspots cover the regions of Amhara, Benshangul - Gumuz, Gambela and SNNP in areas 
bordering Sudan and South Sudan and areas in the Oromia region bordering north-east Kenya.  
In the harshest climate conditions (dry-hot weather), there exist highly localized hotspots for each of these 




stunting, wasting and underweight are mostly located in the Afar zone 2 and in the Gode and Degehabur 
woredas in the Somali region. On the other hand, hotspots of climate security risks and inequality are in 
the coastal areas of Degehabur and Warder woredas in the Somali region, in the Borena and Bale woredas 
in the Oromia region and in the centra parts of the Afar. Finally, hotspots of climate security risks and low 
agricultural productivity in the dry-hot climate areas are in the Shinile Dire Dawa, Karahe, Worder, Liben 
and After woredas in the Somali region.   
CADC countries 
• Is climate exacerbating existing threats that could increase the risk of conflict in the CADC countries 
and in Ethiopia?  
Climate exacerbates food insecurity, poverty and inequality that can lead to more frequent conflicts. Our 
analysis shows that, in El Salvador2, climate exacerbates household level food insecurity, poverty and 
inequality; it reduced income and increases agricultural production costs, which in turn increase the 
likelihood and intensity of conflicts. At national level, we find that precipitation anomalies and temperature 
extremes exacerbate food insecurity, poverty, increase agricultural costs and reduce agricultural income 
which in turn increase the likelihood and the intensity of conflicts at municipal level. Higher poverty and 
agricultural costs also increase the intensity of battles. In areas with high conflict intensity and diversity the 
main climate drivers are lack of precipitation, intensity, and magnitude of the mid-summer drought. These 
climate extremes increase food insecurity, poverty, and inequality which in turn increase the likelihood of 
conflict. 
The impact of climate on food insecurity can cascade in multiple, wider security risks. Our analyses also 
show that the impact of the climate on food security and poverty will result in the increase of multiple 
additional socio-economic risks that are connected to food insecurity and poverty. In El Salvador, for 
instance, in area of high conflict diversity, food security and poverty are connected, through household 
income and the wealth status, to extreme climate events (ENSO and mid-summer drought) and conflicts. 
Household income is also strongly linked with the type of employment of household members and with 
youth unemployment. While wealth in general is strongly connected with agricultural income and 
employment as well as to access to safe water for drinking. This suggests that increased exposure to climate 
impacts of a part of this system, such as food security and poverty, can generate in increasing risks and 
insecurities across multiple dimensions of the network, such as employment, agricultural productivity, and 
access to essential services.  
• Do areas of high climate variability co-occur with high socio-political insecurity in the CADC 
countries and in Ethiopia? 
There exist “climate insecurity hotspots” at sub-national levels where high levels of climate variability, 
conflict intensity and diversity co-occur with other existing socio-economic insecurities. Using spatial 
analysis, we can identify hot spots of climate insecurities. In Guatemala, particular attention should be 
given to the rural and peri-urban areas around Guatemala City, which show high conflict occurrence while 
at the same time being socially vulnerable. We also highlight the subsistence farming areas in 
Huehuetenango, Quiché, and Baja Verapaz, where social vulnerability is high and climate conditions can 
exacerbate this vulnerability. While these areas are classified as having only limited conflict. In Honduras, 
the southern areas (Choluteca department) show significant social and biophysical vulnerability, while also 
 
2 Note that for both Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua we could not run household level analyses due to lack 




showing moderate to high conflict. In these areas, we find occurrence of poorly productive staple crop 
systems, combined with high accessibility to mining concessions and some presence of cash crops (cotton, 
coffee). We also highlight the areas of western Honduras (Copán, Intibucá, Lempira) where nutritional 
insecurity is high, but conflict has low intensity and diversity. In El Salvador, vulnerability hotspots tend to 
cover border areas (with both Honduras and Guatemala), and though these areas do not show high conflict, 
they show high prevalence of stunting. High conflict areas of El Salvador tend to be associated with access 
to opportunities for deforestation, whereas the moderate conflict cluster shows low agricultural 
productivity for staple crops, high density of cash crops, and to a lesser degree access to deforestation 
spots. 
• How can WFP programming become more climate security sensitive? 
Combining the results of our analysis with a series of key informant interviews carried out with 
representatives of different WFP divisions and teams we have identified a set of priority areas to increase 
WFP programming sensitiveness to climate security concerns, that can be summarized as follows: 
i. A monitoring and decision support tool will be key to guide and inform WFP targeting and 
programming at national and sub-national level in a real time fashion. A “Climate Security 
Observatory”, using the methods used in this study, could be designed to link to on-going decision-
making processes, e.g. for the Country Strategic Planning, and should help future initiatives and 
projects in accounting for climate security risks. A proposal for such an Observatory can be found in 
the Appendix.  
ii. Strengthening the adoption of shock responsiveness of national and international interventions and 
policies, that aim to increase the flexibility of social protection policies to cope with crisis in a timely 
fashion and use early warning systems and protocols to prevent crisis and not only to prepare for 
upcoming ones.  An example of this can be found in the Caribbean, and especially in Jamaica, Dominica, 
British Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas, where national cash transfer and/or voucher programmes were 
effectively leveraged to provide relief support during shocks (Barca et al. 2019). Linking these 
programmes with school feeding interventions will ensure that schools are kept open where possible 
and that children, households and local producers can increase their hazard resilience in the short to 
medium term. 
iii. Addressing the root causes of conflict while maintaining neutrality and improving climate resilience, 
via separating humanitarian and development needs from the causes of conflicts, keeping the advocacy 
focus with the national and local governments on human rights and provision of technical assistance 
to governments and local decision makers and enhancing active participation of communities in the 
design of interventions. Addressing root causes of conflicts can be done using for example the 
complaint mechanisms. These effective tools are critical for EME to understand where local grievances 
are building and can be used to start the discussions on those with local governments. Active presence 
in the field is also important. In Tigray for example WFP EME has deployed two staff to improve WFP 
programming sensitivity to conflict via directly engaging with local communities in the region to 
understand their needs during periods of crisis. Finally, in Tanzania, using the findings of an impact 
analysis in refugee camps, EME has been able to advocate for the withdrawal of restrictions imposed 
by the government on the refugee population, which had a significant impact on the role of women in 
the communities. Strengthening the field presence and the real time monitoring of risks, grievances 
and tensions will be critical for changing and saving lives of people in climate insecure areas.  
iv. Adopting truly integrated programming within WFP interventions, which accounts for the complexity 
and interconnectedness of the climate security nexus and that accurately defines and assess risks and 




there exist high nutrition insecurities, and following the three-pronged approach, FFA should 
collaborate with the humanitarian and emergency teams to improve immediate food security needs of 
the targeted population. This will ensure that FFA beneficiaries are healthy and able to contribute to 
FFA related activities and at the same time continue improving their food security. Other important 
complementary activities are those that improve energy access and access to alternative fuels. 
v. Making women the agents of change, by tailoring interventions to reduce inequalities, counteracting 
existing social norms, and fostering women’s leadership roles to decrease tensions at community level. 
For example, in Libya, WFP has implemented activities to rebuild livelihoods along the Tunisia and Libya 
border, working specifically with women, who are now recognised as acting leaders in their 
communities, have increased livelihood opportunities and improved their education. Also in Nicaragua, 
WFP has provided a “degranadora” machine, that has reduced drastically the time that women used 
for maize processing, allowing them to produce outputs of higher quality and freed time for women to 
attend community meetings.  
Challenges and limitations of the analyses3 
Using a data driven approach presents some limitations. One is the availability of data. Some of the analyses 
were not carried out due to the lack of secondary socio-economic data. This is an important limitation that 
constrained mostly the estimation of the household level drivers of the climate security nexus in Guatemala 
and Honduras. In the case of Guatemala, the household level analysis was not feasible as a critical 
identification variable was missing from the available datasets: the “Encuesta National de Condiciones de 
Vida”. Honduras has a wealth of socio-economic datasets, collected each year since 2012, via the “Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples”. Unfortunately, these data are not publicly available.  
Furthermore, data driven approaches require validation from qualitative analysis (stakeholders’ 
interviews and focus group discussions). Field work in the main hotspots of climate insecurities could help 
testing which of the mechanisms identified in the quantitative analyses explain the climate security nexus 
better. Finally, directly engaging with local communities will help identify those, if any, traditional and 
non-traditional mitigating factors, and systems that could alter the climate security nexus identified in 
this analysis4.  
 
3 As highlighted by SIPRI, ACLED data provide a limited coverage of homicide events as they mostly focus on 
violence, conflict, tensions, and related socio-political co-variate insecurities affecting a group of individuals in 
certain geographical areas. This limitation might be important in the context of the CADC countries where 
homicide rates are higher. Nonetheless, when we compare the “security proxy” constructed using official 
police department social media data on any criminal events we find an extremely high correlation between 
what ACLED data capture and our security proxy, which gives us confidence on the ability of the former to 
capture the overall level of insecurity in the counties under analysis.  
4 Another major limitation of the analyses presented in this report regards the access to and systematization of 
WFP data. Linking WFP operations data with our analyses was particularly important for the assessment of the 
sensitivity of WFP targeting and programming to the climate security nexus. During this project, we were only 
able to access SCOPE data for Ethiopia. SCOPE data has allowed us to map WFP interventions across the 
country and to have a general understanding of the type of activities implemented and for whom. However, 
these data are not comprehensive and are very limited in scope, width and length which has severely affected 
our ability to evaluate the climate security sensitivity of WFP interventions. This part of the analyses was 
indeed removed from this report and added to the Appendix. We acknowledge that there exists a wealth of 
WFP data that is underutilized across the organization and much more could be done for this and related 




Introduction and research questions  
The changing climate has shown to have a negative impact on livelihoods in developing countries. The main 
reason is that most economic and labour opportunities depend on the agricultural sector, which is 
increasingly influenced by strong climate variability around equatorial areas of the world (Beg et al. 2002; 
Campbell et al. 2016; Vermeulen, Campbell, and Ingram 2012). Some regions are more prone to extreme 
climate events, amongst them the Central American Dry Corridor (CADC) and the Horn of Africa. Specifically 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua are projected to be affected more frequently by strong 
precipitation variability and intense droughts (Stocker et al. 2013). Similarly, in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia 
is one of the world’s most drought-prone countries (USAID 2016). Since the 1970s, drought occurrence has 
increased in magnitude, frequency, and impact, leaving millions of people in need of food assistance each 
year (GFDRR 2016)5. The more frequently occurring droughts and floods in these regions are increasingly 
posing a threat to internal food security (Imbach et al. 2017). In the words of the UN Secretary General, 
"The fallout of the assault on our planet” - (cfr increasing climate impacts) - “is impeding our efforts to 
eliminate our poverty and imperilling food security"6. Without peace, there is no end to hunger. Without 
food security, peace cannot last. And without climate sensitive actions for peace and security, none of these 
efforts will succeed. 
Multiple pathways of the climate security nexus can be identified. Scheffran et al. (2012), for instance, 
argue that climate indirectly affects the likelihood of conflict outbreaks through multiple channels such as 
water shortage, crop failures, human migration, and institutional effectiveness. Specifically, in agricultural 
households, climate variability and extreme weather events are likely to affect incomes through reduced 
agricultural outputs. Opportunity costs theory implies the existence of a strong inverse relationship 
between rebellion and incomes from agricultural activity (Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011). Hence, the loss of 
agricultural income due to the negative impact of climatic impacts could trigger conflict events. 
Additionally, climate-induced migration can burden competition over resources such as land, employment, 
education, health care and social service and possibly cause ethnic tensions (Brzoska and Fröhlich 2016; 
Reuveny 2007).  
The current literature does not display an exact consensus on the interface of climate and peace. Many 
authors have attempted to estimate the causal effect of climate on conflict7. These studies mostly look at 
the longer-term effects of climate change. The increasing impacts of irregular weather and seasonal 
patterns, the increasing intensity and frequency of climate hazards such as drought, floods, landslides 
significantly impact the livelihoods of millions across the world, but in a relatively shorter-term scale. 
Therefore, a significant part of the climate security literature has increasingly shifted the focus from larger 
and longer-term changes in climatic conditions to almost current and near current climate hazards – 
otherwise related as climate variability (Buhaug, 2010, Theisen et al., 2012, Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014, 
 
5 According to the Global Facility For Disaster Reduction And Recovery (GFDRR), the 2011 Horn of Africa drought, 
for instance, left more than 4.5 million people in need of food assistance.  
6 02 December 2020 UN Secretary General speech on the state of the planet. 
https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/un-secretary-general-speaks-state-planet  
7 For example, Burke et al. (2009) find a robust link between temperature increases and civil war in African 
countries. Similarly, Hendrix & Glaser (2007) conclude that positive changes in rainfall lead to a decrease in 
likelihood of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. By conducting a meta-analysis of 60 studies, Hsiang et al. (2013) 
also find an overall significant relationship between climate and conflict. Another larger scale study using a 
sample of 57 western and non-western countries shows that increasing temperatures can lead to increase in 




Gartzke, 2012, Chen et al., 2016). These authors argue that climate does not have a direct effect of peace 
and security but, rather, it acts as a “threat multiplier”, exacerbating existing socio-economic risks and 
insecurities such as agricultural losses, food insecurity or forced migration, which can increase the risk, 
duration and intensity of political insecurity and conflicts and therefore impact peace and security 
(Causevic, 2017; Gilmore, 2017; Hsiang et al., 2013; Scheffran et al., 2014; Koubi, 2019). This is what is called 
the "climate security nexus". Food insecurity can lead to violent conflict on a national and international 
scale when exacerbated by climate impacts and associated with further insecurities, such as poverty, 
inequality and overall socio-political fragility (Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2018; Koren and Bagozzi 2016). 
Conflicts such as gang violence, homicides, robberies and increasing participation in recruitment of armed 
groups are endangering food and human security (Fogelbach 2011; Tellman et al. 2014). The main 
underlying forces can be attributable to economic instability and loss of job opportunities, loss of 
agricultural land and money for education. The last especially is affecting local youth, leading them to be 
drawn into illegal groups and violent activities, often as the last resort (Olate, Salas-Wright, and Vaughn 
2012; Williams and Castellanos 2020).  
Several scholars confirm that with droughts, strong rainfall variability and the past presence of civil wars, 
communities are more susceptible to acts of violence (O’Loughlin et al. 2012; Raleigh, Jin, and Kniveton 
2015). These conditions, i.e. high climate variabilities, high political insecurity, and conflicts and widespread 
food and nutrition insecurities across their populations, have been strongly present in the CADC and 
Ethiopia. However, evidence from current research focusing specifically on the climate-food security-
conflict nexus in these geographical area are scarce (Adams et al. 2018). Since several years many studies 
have focused on food security as one of the main drivers of conflict (Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012; Hendrix 
and Brinkman 2013; Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2019; Nordkvelle, Rustad, and Salmivalli 2017; Raleigh, Jin, 
and Kniveton 2015), leaving the question on the linkage between climate induced food insecurity and 
conflict unanswered. The opportunity is great to take the numerous insights from climate change literature 
and food security studies and place it in relation to the wider climate security nexus.  
In this study we use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods and data to enrich our 
knowledge of the complex, context specific and dynamic pathways through which climate affects the risk 
of conflict. We specifically assess the links between climate-induced food insecurity and conflict. The main 
research questions are:  
• Is climate exacerbating existing threats that could increase the risk of conflict in the CADC countries 
and in Ethiopia?  
• Do areas of high climate variability co-occur with high socio-political insecurity in the CADC 
countries and in Ethiopia? 
• How can WFP programming become more climate security sensitive? 
The results of this study are intended to inform WFP’s understanding of the climate and conflict nexus and 
support the organization in addressing these through future WFP’s Country Strategic Plans in the CADC and 
Ethiopia. In addition, this research fits into the wider WFP-SIPRI-CGIAR joint research framework whose 
objective is to qualify and quantify the climate security nexus and to assess if, and how, WFP’s programming 
is mitigating conflict risk, including both the challenge of conflict-sensitive programming and WFP’s role in 
longer-term peacebuilding efforts against the backdrop of negative climate trends8.  
 
8 The document “CGIAR Responses to WFP main comments” submitted to WFP on the 30th of April 2021 clearly 
describes the linkages between this study and the WFP-CGIAR-SIPRI research framework.  A summary of this 





Figure 1 summarizes the analysis steps with corresponding methods, study scales, purposes, and analysis-
specific questions, in relation to the overall research questions of the study9. The impact pathway analyses 
“qualify the climate security nexus” by giving national context on the CS-nexus from both, scientific and 
policy perspective. The impact pathway analyses develop clear and coherent narratives that describe any 
known links between peace, security, conflict, climate, and other existing insecurities.  
These impact pathways (IPs) are base for selecting variables (or proxies) to be used in the quantitative 
analysis, and for defining a set of empirical hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent econometric and 
network analysis. The purpose of the econometric and network analysis is to quantify the indirect impact 
of climate variability on existing risks and insecurities based on household and larger scale level data, 
respectively. These analyses are run at national level and by conflict clusters, i.e. geographic areas where 
reported conflict events share certain characteristics10. The purpose of the spatial analysis is to map the 
climate security nexus across different conflict drivers, i.e. to show where climate, conflict and other 
insecurities co-occur.  
Key Informant Interviews (KII) were also conducted to identify priority areas to increase climate security 
sensitiveness of WFP programming. 
 
9 A detailed description of each analytical step can be found in the Appendix.   
10 Cognizant of the heterogeneity of the security risks across different regions and woredas in Ethiopia, we divide 
the country in a set of conflict clusters. We define ‘conflict clusters’ as geographic areas where reported conflict 
events share certain characteristics. These clusters are developed through statistical analysis of conflict data 
aggregated at the municipality (CADC) and woreda (Ethiopia) level, respectively. The variables included aim at 
characterizing conflict in three dimensions, namely, intensity, geographic coverage, and diversity. For each 
country, we estimated three main clusters representing level of high, moderate, or limited conflict intensity and 
richness. Clustering was performed following (Chavent et al. 2018) incorporating geospatial constraints into the 

















The climate security nexus in Ethiopia 
Summary of findings 
1) Two main impact pathways explain the potential linkages between climate and conflict in Ethiopia: 
the natural resources pathway and the weak governance and maladaptation pathway.  
2) Climate exacerbates existing household level risks and insecurities that can increase the likelihood and 
intensity of conflict. In other words, we find evidence that climate is a threat multiplier. We find that 
climate exacerbates household level food and nutrition insecurity and reduces agricultural 
employment, which in turn increase the likelihood and intensity of conflicts.  
3) In addition to climate induced insecurities, there exist other important household level predictors of 
conflict, such as age, education, and gender of the head of the household, ethnicity, access to 
electricity and location.  
4) The climate security nexus – the way climate, socio-economic and political risks and insecurities are 
linked to each other – differs across the country and conflict clusters. The climate security nexus is 
characterized by the combination of aridity (ecological system), nutrition insecurity, high population 
pressure, lack of education and higher number of people in a crisis (socio-economic system) and 
intensity and diversity of conflicts (political system) at national level and across conflict clusters.  
5) There exist “climate insecurity hotspots” at sub-national level where high level of climate variability, 
conflict intensity and diversity co-occur with other existing socio-economic insecurities.  We find the 
following areas where harsh climate conditions, conflict, food insecurity co-occur with a number of 
other socio-economic drivers in a time period of 1980-2020:  
1. The north-eastern part of the Afar region, encompassing the woredas of Elidar, Dubti, Mile, and 
Afambo. 
2. The north (Ayisha and Shinile woredas), eastern (Danot, Warder, Shilabo, Kebridehar, Denan, 
Shekosh, Gunagado, Aware, Gashamo), and southern (Dolo Odo, Filtu, Moyale) parts of the 
Somali region. 
3. The Gulomekeda and Erob woredas in Tigray –both bordering with Eritrea 
In these areas, we find:  
• high (>25%) prevalence of stunting, wasting and underweight children,  
• low levels (< 3 years of schooling) of education for men and large gaps (>1.5 years of schooling) 
between men and women, 
• low levels of agricultural productivity Net Primary Product (NPP < 2,500 kg-C/ha/year), high NPP 











Qualifying the climate security nexus in the CADC countries – an impact pathway 
analysis 
Impact pathway analysis 
Ethiopia is extremely vulnerable to changing climatic conditions (Germanwatch). Extensive periods of 
droughts have become more frequent in the past decade and caused significant economic losses, primarily 
through their impact on agricultural productivity. Studies on Ethiopia and on East Africa more broadly 
principally agree that there are observable relationships between climate variability, agriculture, resource 
availability and management, and conflict events (Detges, 2017; Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Hendrix & 
Salehyan, 2012; Landis, 2014; Megerssa & Bekere, 2019; Nordkvelle et al., 2017; O’Loughlin et al., 2012; 
Theisen et al., 2012). Based on an exhaustive literature review11, Figure 2 visualises the climate security 
nexus for Ethiopia that will inform the analysis in this report. We highlight two important paths: 
1. Natural resources pathway: climate-induced scarcity can heighten inter-household and inter-
group competition over access to and usage of scarce resources, potentially leading to tensions and 
violence, particularly when migration is not an option. Climate-induced migration may also, 
however, both directly and indirectly contribute to conflict by producing inter-group tensions or 
putting increasing pressure on resources in destination areas.  
2. Weak governance and maladaptation pathway: weak governance and a lack of institutional 
support for adaptation can cause households and communities to pursue maladaptive practices or 
fail to adapt altogether, leading to an inequitable distribution of climate vulnerability based on 
hierarchy and potentially negative downstream effects for other households or communities. This 
can serve as a pathway towards intra- and inter-group grievances and tensions.    
Climate variability, characterised by irregular seasons and weather patterns, floods, droughts and 
heatwaves, and an increased prevalence of pests and disease can cause resource scarcity if households are 
unable to adapt. This scarcity can be exacerbated by contextual social and institutional factors which impact 
household and community choice and access to scarce resources, intra-community inequality, knowledge 
of and ability to apply adaptive and absorptive practices, limited formal and informal support services, 
insufficient agricultural extension services, and a lack of economic opportunities. Whilst scarcity may cause 
some populations to become ‘trapped’ in scarce contexts, others may turn to migration strategies. There 
exists a great deal of variation in terms of both the exact nature and impact of climate migration. Generally 
speaking, however, climate migration can (given the presence of appropriate auxiliary conditions) lead to 
conflict both directly due to socio-economic or cultural tensions between new and host populations (or at 
an international scale between distrustful governments) or indirectly by increasing pressure on scarce 
natural resources, labour markets, and support services, thereby potentially threatening existing 
livelihoods in host communities and causing a loss of prosperity. A loss of prosperity, increased poverty, 
food and nutrition insecurity, and inequality, can instigate adaptation strategies that may increase 
insecurity and tension, especially when households are highly reliant on agriculture. Rural-urban migration, 
for instance, has put pressure on social services and labour markets, pushing many into informal, low-wage, 
insecure, and sometimes dangerous employment. These risks are often exacerbated for women. Poor job 
quality and security, coupled with high vertical or horizontal inequality, can lower the opportunity cost for 
engaging in criminal activity or give rise to group-based grievances and inter-group tensions. 
 




More generally, the climate security nexus creates specific and unique challenges for men and women. 
Whilst drought-induced economic hardships have forced men to migrate into urban areas to find new job 
opportunities or join armed groups to earn money, and adolescent boys face the prospect of being taken 
out of school to help with household labour and water collection  (Le Masson et al. 2016), women and girls 
have become disproportionately more vulnerable and exposed to violations of their rights. Water stress 
and scarcity have placed women and girls at higher risk of exploitation, harassment, and violence (Swarup 
et al. 2011), visible for instance in the increasing number of families selling girls for early marriage in 
exchange for livestock. 
Furthermore, the nature and type of adaptation is largely influenced by the financial capacity a household 
possesses, as well as the degree to which adaptive practices are culturally and communally accepted. For 
instance, climate change has disproportionately affected women and girls as a result of gender norms and 
practices that have constrained their adaptive capacities (Wossen 2016). Women have experienced 
domestic violence as a spill-over effect of frustrated masculinities and anxieties over household insecurity, 
as well as rape and sexual abuse when walking long distances to collect water (Sommer et al. 2015). In 
Lalibela, adolescent girls have been documented to miss school during periods of drought because of poor 
sanitation and time dedicated to fetching water (Swarup et al. 2011). Combined climate shocks, gender-
based violence and discriminatory practices have compromised the productivity and adaptive capacity of 
women who rely on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods. In several areas of rural 
Ethiopia, women have limited access to farmland, water and agricultural credits compared to men, and this 
structural condition has been further aggravated by climate-induced scarcity that has caused women to 
lose their traditional control over resources (Wossen 2016). Low access to agricultural market and 
restricted access to alternative livelihood options have led women to experience widespread poverty and 
severe food insecurity, making them particularly susceptible to trafficking, sexual abuse and forcing them 
to migrate into local towns or enter prostitution to earn money (Swarup et al. 2011).  
There equally exists a relationship between the nature of adaptation and the institutional and governance 
frameworks and capacities within which communities live, such as the degree of success and scope of social 
support efforts or extension services. A lack of or weak governance can, for example, lead to maladaptive 
strategies being deployed by communities that have negative downstream effects on their households and 
other communities. The loss in productivity can lead to income loss and the selling of productive assets 
such as livestock to secure short-term survival, thereby eroding purchasing power and contributing to 
further food insecurity and malnutrition. Conversely, productivity gain and therefore food abundance has 
been linked with more intra-community disruptions due to intra-community inequalities, including gender 
inequality and rent-seeking behaviour. Such intra-communal inequality, and the kind of behaviours it 
enables, can also be conceptualised as facilitating the adoption of maladaptive strategies centred around 
an unequal distribution of resources, evidencing the indirect causal pathways through which climate factors 
interact with local social, political, and institutional factors.  
A lack of access to the market (formal sources of credit and investment) and support in the form of 
extension service and adequate weather and climate information further prevents adaptation, further 
contributes to food insecurity, and increases the risk of conflict. The significance of this must be seen in the 
context of Ethiopia-Somalia border disputes and the presence of armed groups in the region, for which 





Figure 2. The climate security nexus in Ethiopia, 
an impact pathway analysis. Note (1): There is a 
complex web of interactions linking the impacts 
of climate variability on conflict in Ethiopia. The 
aim of these impact pathways is primarily to 
investigate how to bridge between the two 
elements with an additional focus on food 
insecurity as an intermediate driver. In the graph 
we are highlighting two important paths, of 
which each originates on the left-hand side, 
where we can see how climate variability impacts 
are effective (irregular season and weather 
pattern; floods, droughts and heatwaves; pests 
and diseases). These pathways are highly 
qualitative and contextual. They display 
relationships and potential avenues, rather than 
unavoidable outcomes, and are dependent on the 





Quantifying the climate security nexus in Ethiopia 
ACLED reports conflict events of six different types, namely, battles, violence against civilians, 
explosions / remote violence, riots, protests, and strategic developments. For the period 1997–
present, ACLED data included 5,666 individual events in total and 46,733 fatalities, distributed as 
shown in Figure 3 below. 
Across the whole country, as well as on a cluster-specific basis (see Figure 4), battles and protests are 
the dominant type of conflict observed, followed by protests. A large number of battles also leads to 
a large number of deaths, whereas the converse is true for the protests. Consistent with this, armed 
clashes are the most frequent type of battle, whereas the most common type of protest is ‘peaceful 
protest’. Armed clashes can take many forms, but the most common is a clash between the Military 
Forces of Ethiopia (involved as one of the actors in 1,381 out of the 1,870-armed clashes reported) and 
different types of non-state armed (guerrilla) groups. Two common non-state groups which often clash 
with the Ethiopian Military are the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF, 291 battles reported) and the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF, 512 battles reported). 
 
  











































































Figure 4 shows the geographic distribution of the three resulting conflict clusters and their general 
characteristics in terms of conflict occurrence and fatalities. A substantial part of Ethiopia shows no 
reports of conflict in the ACLED database (grey areas). In the rest of the country, our analysis 
identifies classifies conflict in three groups: 
• Limited conflict cluster (LCC): This group occurs primarily across rural areas in which cash crops 
are an important source of income. LCC shows the lowest average diversity of conflict types and 
subtypes, actors, as well as the lowest number of events and fatalities.  
• Moderate conflict cluster (MCC): This group also occurs throughout rural areas, but is typically 
associated with pastoral and agropastoral areas across the Afar and the Somali regions. Average 
conflict intensity, diversity and geographic coverage are moderate in this cluster. 
• High conflict cluster (HCC): This group occurs in localized spots within Ethiopia, showing a 
substantially larger average intensity, diversity and geographic coverage of conflict. HCC includes 
the western part of Addis Ababa, and two woredas on the border with Eritrea (Erob, Gulomekeda 
–Tigray area) which have a large number of fatalities owing to specific events related to the 
Ethiopian–Eritrean war (1998–2000). In fact, in 1999 alone, the Ethiopian–Eritrean war reportedly 
led to 10,153 fatalities (3,692 in Erob and 6,461 in Gulomekeda). HCC also includes Jijiga (Somali 
region); Gonder Zuria and Bahir Dar Zuria (Amhara); and Moyale, Chinaksen, and Gursum 
(Oromia). These woredas have been subject of constant struggle between the Ethiopian Military 
and both the Oromo Liberation Front (seeking the independence of the Oromo peoples) as well as 
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (seeking the independence of the Somali region). Political 
marginalization, ethnic claims to territory, and land and other resources have been key drivers 
behind these conflicts. Both the OLF and ONLF either ceased fire or signed peace agreements in 
the last two years. 
Figure 4. Geographic distribution of conflict clusters in Ethiopia. The bar charts to the left show the average relative 
distribution of different event types for each cluster, and the total conflict intensity (# events –top, # fatalities –bottom) 

























































































































The climate security nexus at household level 
Drawing on the impact pathway analysis, we test whether climate induced food and nutrition insecurity, 
poverty and inequality have an impact on conflict at household level. Poverty, inequality, food, and 
nutrition security, especially when linked to agricultural losses due to the climate impacts have all been 
identified as major drivers that when exacerbated by climate risks could lead to increased socio-political 
insecurities, both within the “natural resource” and “weak governance” pathways. In line with these 
pathways, we also test whether reliance on agriculture (farm employment and livestock farming) increases 
the likelihood and intensity of conflicts when impacted by adverse climatic conditions.  
The results of the analyses are summarised and presented in Figure 5. They confirm our hypothesis that 
climate exacerbates existing insecurities and increases the risks of conflicts in Ethiopia. The estimates show 
that climate induced12 food and nutrition insecurities, poverty and inequality increase the likelihood of the 
occurrence of conflicts at woreda level. These results differ significantly depending on the type and 
intensity of conflicts.  The role of climate induced food security as a driver of conflict is particularly evident 
at national level and in the HCC and MCC, while it is not significant in the LCC. Even though the relationship 
among violent conflict and food insecurity has attracted large attention in the past years, there is a general 
lack of quantitative studies that try to assess the causality between food insecurity and the occurrence of 
conflicts. Until the past decade, most of the analysis that consider the correlation among these two aspects 
are principally focused on estimating the impact of conflict on food insecurity rather that the other way 
around (Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2019).  More recently, scholars have also increased their interest in 
quantifying the impact of food insecurities on conflicts and social unrest and find that, indeed, food 
insecurity can increase the likelihood and intensity of conflicts (Bellemare 2015; Koren and Bagozzi 2016; 
Maystadt and Ecker 2014). Similarly, Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008 find evidence that food insecurity can 
increase the likelihood of joining armed groups. Finally, Berazneva & Lee (2013) show that higher food 
prices and riots are correlated with an increasing political repression. Our results are in line with this 
literature in showing that higher climate induced food insecurity can lead to an increased risk of conflict.  
Our analyses also show that poverty, when impacted by climate, increases the likelihood of conflicts and 
the number of battles at woreda level. There is a vast literature that posit a relationship between poverty 
and conflict (Collier et al. 2003; Collier, Bank, and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hess and 
Orphanides 1995; Sambanis 2004). A growing literature also explicitly investigates the role of poverty in 
increasing the risk of conflicts (Collier et al. 2003; Collier, Bank, and Hoeffler 2002; Djankov and Reynal-
Querol 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; T. Gurr 1970; Jakobsen, de Soysa, and Jakobsen 2013; Muller and 
Seligson 1987). Conflicts are often seen as a consequence the “failure of economic development” (Collier 
et al. 2003) or a “problem of the poor” (Sambanis 2002)13. These studies find that recruitment in rebel 
groups constitutes a common coping strategy for the poorest, especially in presence of weak states and 
institutions (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In the case of Ethiopia, we observe this effect at national level only. 
The impact of climate induced poverty on conflict becomes insignificant in the cluster level results.  
 
12 Here we use the term induced in a very loose way, as we acknowledge that there are many other factors that 
drive food insecurity. Our assumption, which is validated by our statistical tests is, however, that climate 
variability is effective in capturing the degree and extent of food insecurity patterns and trends in the woredas 
in Ethiopia. 
13 But as in the case of food security, these studies do not provide any details regarding those mechanisms, 
such as climate, that could exacerbate poverty and render it a significant driver of insecurity (Collier, Bank, and 
Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Jakobsen, de Soysa, and Jakobsen 2013; Miguel, Satyanath, and 




Interestingly, inequality, measured as the ratio of poorest to the richest at woreda level, significantly 
increases the likelihood and intensity of conflicts (battles) in those woredas in the low intensity conflict 
clusters. Economic inequality has often been found as an important predictor of conflict and overall political 
instability (Alesina and Perotti 1996; J. A. Booth 1991; Boyce 1996; Cramer 2003; T. R. Gurr 2015; Nafziger 
and Auvinen 1997a; Wickam-Crowley 1992). More recently, some authors have challenged these views 
claiming that high inequality does not necessarily translates into political instability. Instead, it is important 
to unveil those mechanisms that “enable a relatively peaceable durable inequality to turn into a violent 
conflict” (Cramer 2003). There is quite strong evidence that climate impacts could be exacerbate these 
mechanisms, as it is found to significantly exacerbate economic inequality (Pacillo et al. 2020). In line with 
these studies, our findings suggest that adverse climatic conditions can exacerbate economic inequality 
which in turn can increase the likelihood of conflicts and instability in those areas in Ethiopia historically 
less affected by conflict events.  
Finally, our results show that reliance on agricultural activities has a limited and non-consistent role in 
explaining conflicts in Ethiopia. As proxy for the reliance on agriculture, we use agricultural employment 
and number of cattle in the woreda. Past literature suggests that that lower demand of agricultural labour, 
due to a decrease of agricultural productivity, is associated with higher conflict density (Barnett and Adger 
2007; Guardado and Pennings 2020; Kelley et al. 2015; Raleigh, Jin, and Kniveton 2015). Similarly, natural 
resource scarcity as aggravated by adverse climatic conditions is expected to increase pastoral conflicts and 
therefore, we would expect that the higher density of livestock the higher the number of conflicts 
(Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). Our results do not confirm these hypotheses. Farm employment is not 
significant in any of the specifications, while livestock density is only significant at national level and not 
consistent throughout the conflict clusters. Thus, we find that higher livestock density increases the 
likelihood of conflicts and the number of battles, but it reduces the number of overall conflicts and riots. 
The lack of significance of agriculture and livestock production in the estimation of the climate security 
nexus can be explained by the fact that these two variables do not necessarily represent insecurities per 
se.  
Among other drivers of conflicts, ethnicity consistently increases the risk and intensity of conflicts at 
national level and in the HCC and MCC. Ethiopia is historically involved in ethnic base conflicts. Consistently 
with Yusuf (2019), who depicted the history of ethnic base conflict, we found that all the selected ethnic 
groups (Amhara, Oromo, Tigrinya, Somalie) are positively and significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
conflict and its intensity (number of conflict events, number of battles). Similarly, access to electricity is 
highly significant and consistently positively associated with the higher likelihood of conflicts, especially in 
the high intensity conflict cluster. This could be explained by the urban nature of protests and riots and 
similar conflict events. Yusuf (2019) for instance argues that ethnic marginalisation and weak governance 
in support of the most marginalised have caused the insurgences of grievances and tensions that often 
results in riots and protests in towns and cities across Ethiopia. Growing urbanisations and the use of social 
media are some of the key factors that facilitated the organisations of such events in urban areas.   
Finally, lack of education is also an important driver of conflicts. Previous studies have found evidence that 
inequality of educational opportunities can increase grievances and lead to conflict (Kett and Rowson 2007; 
McLean Hilker 2011). Our results show that lack of education, of women in particular, significantly increases 










Figure 5. Heat maps of results of the econometric analysis quantifying the climate impacts on conflicts via the exacerbation of existing insecurities in Ethiopia, at country level (panel A), in the 




The large-scale climate security nexus: cascading risks in the climate security nexus 
The analyses presented thus far show how the climate security nexus occur across low scale drivers 
that are estimated at household level. However, there exist some important drivers that can only be 
observed at larger scale, at municipality or district level.  
We run network analyses at country level and across the conflict clusters. For network analysis to be 
robust we need sufficient data points. For this reason, the HCC, which is the smallest cluster of the 
Ethiopia dataset, was removed from the analysis. Figures 6 show the networks at country level, where 
the purple nodes represent climate variables, whilst the green nodes represent socio-economic 
variables. Conflict is represented in yellow. Table 1 summarises the results of the analyses at country 
and conflict cluster level, listing the main large drivers and their relationship with climate and security 
in Ethiopia. 
The findings show that there exist clear relationships between several key socio-economic variables 
(nodes), climate and conflicts. For instance, the strongest links (thickest edges) between ecological 
and social/economic systems can be observed between climate and prevalence of insufficient food 
(FCS) and aridity. Conflicts, on the other hand (represented by four key variables – fatalities, events, 
richness, and subtype richness), have the strongest relationship with education, stunting (childhood 
stunting) and population per district. Moreover, there exists a strong relationship between three 
education nodes, upper net primary productivity (upper npp) and percentage of people in crisis (rCSI). 
We also see that the variables resulting in conflict do not act in isolation. Population per district which 
has the thickest line to conflict is itself connected to percentage of people in a crisis (rCSI) and aridity. 
By following pathways of connectivity, we can gain a greater understanding of the complex nature of 
conflict, and how management interventions must consider multiple factors at play. 
At conflict cluster level (Table 1 and Figure S3 in the Appendix) education variables still maintain the 
strongest links in the network in both MCC and LCC as well as the overall network. Education has the 
greatest influence and power in the system largely due to educations link to a suite of other 
socioeconomic variables. In the MCC, all conflict variables are also linked to population per district. The 
population per district in turn has a strong relationship with aridity index. This cluster is situated largely 
in pastoral area and so conflict outbreaks are likely to be more strongly associated with climate drivers 
most closely linked to atmospheric demand (aridity). When we look at the LCC, we can see how 
although conflict is still largely driven by population per district as in MCC the nodes to population per 
district have now shifted to rCSI (percentage of people in a crisis) and education i.e., from more climate 
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Figure 6. Network analysis of Ethiopia's socio-economic, climate and conflict variables at a country (all) level. 
 
Table 1. Table showing main large-scale drivers and their relationship with climate and conflict identified in the network 





Mapping the climate security nexus  
Climate, conflict, and food security hotspots 
In Ethiopia, our analysis identified four distinct groups of climate conditions (Figure 7a). To ease 
interpretation, these groups are named ‘dry-hot’, ‘dry-warm’, ‘dry-cool’, and ‘humid’ (see the 
Appendix for more details on the methods). An overlay of these climate groups with the conflict 
clusters shows the climate groups occur in different frequencies and locations within the three conflict 
clusters (Figure 7b).  
We also determined food insecurity groups (three groups, as shown in Figure 7c), and then intersected 
these with the climate and conflict areas of Figure 7b. In grouping the spatial variation of food 
insecurity, we also include migration. This is because the spatial scale of the migration data available 
at the time of this analysis did not allow for a more detailed analysis. The findings of the analysis can 
be summarised as follows (see Figure 7d): 
• Conflict-climate spatial associations are diverse and complex. Climate conditions vary widely 
across conflict clusters, and likewise conflict levels vary widely across climate conditions. The 
moderate and limited conflict clusters experience the entire range of climate conditions, whereas 
the HCC does not occur in the ‘dry-hot’ climate. 
• Extreme and severe food insecurity (as defined by the groups established here) are experienced 
throughout virtually the entire conflict – climate space. This means that, in each existing 
combination of conflict cluster and climate, it is always possible to identify the areas with greatest 
food insecurity (darkest areas per colour type in Figure 7d). 
• The dry-hot and food insecure areas are often in border regions with other countries (e.g., Somalia, 
Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti). We highlight areas of severe food insecurity in the dry-hot environments 
of the Somali region within the moderate conflict cluster. These areas warrant attention for 
addressing food insecurity and climate resilience. 
At this point, we refrain from sub-selecting or classifying woredas as hotspots of conflict–climate–food 
insecurity, since our data analysis shows that even those areas classified as having ‘moderate’ food 
insecurity can have relatively high rCSI (percentage of people using crisis or above crisis food-based 
coping), FCS (prevalence of insufficient food –the sum of ‘poor’ and ‘borderline’ consumption in the 
FCS), as well as prevalence of stunting, underweight, and wasting. We thus concentrate on assessing 
the spatial dimension of some of the other key drivers, as identified in the network analysis: nutrition 
security, inequality – measured by unequal access to education, and agricultural productivity. These 
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Figure 7. Climate groups (a), their intersection with conflict clusters (b), food insecurity groups (c), and their intersection 
with climate and conflict for Ethiopia (d). The bottom legend corresponds to panel (d). The numbers within the colour 
legend of panel (d) indicate the number of woredas in each combination of conflict – climate – food insecurity. Food 
security levels (Ex: extreme, Se: severe, and Mo: moderate). Migration levels (+: immigration and -: outmigration). Climate 





Nutritional outcomes within climate, conflict, and food security hotspots 
We characterise nutrition using the prevalence of stunting, underweight and wasting as derived from 
the Local Burden of Disease. Figure 8 shows the hotspots (dark brown areas in the map on the right) 
of high prevalence (75% percentile across Ethiopia or greater) of nutritional problems across the 
climate–conflict–food insecurity nexus (map on the left in Figure 8).  
 
While the maps show the entirety of Ethiopia, it is also possible to visualize these results for specific 
conflict–climate–food insecurity combinations. Therefore, combining the results of the hotspot analysis of 
the climate-conflict-food security nexus (small map on the left) with the analysis of nutrition insecurity 
hotspots (map on the right), we can identify three areas which possess severe nutritional problems, while 
also showing significant levels of conflict, being located in harsh climate conditions, and also experiencing 
high levels of food insecurity: 
• The north-eastern part of the Afar department, encompassing the woredas of Elidar, Dubti, Mile, and 
Afambo. 
• The north (Ayisha and Shinile woredas), eastern (Danot, Warder, Shilabo, Kebridehar, Denan, Shekosh, 
Gunagado, Aware, Gashamo), and southern (Dolo Odo, Filtu, Moyale) parts of the Somali region. 
• The Gulomekeda and Erob woredas in Tigray –both bordering with Eritrea 
We also identify several instances in which poor nutritional outcomes co-occur with low conflict and 
favourable climate conditions, such as the west of Ethiopia (Benshangul-Gumaz region). 
Inequality within climate, conflict, and food security hotspots 
We characterise inequality using two variables: (i) the average number of education years for men, and 
(ii) the gap in education years between men and women. Lack of education is one of the key drivers of 
conflict identified by the network analysis and household level analysis. The average education years for 
Figure 8. Undernutrition hotspots (map on the right) and the conflict–food insecurity–climate nexus (map on the left). The 





men allows analysing the equality in access to education as a potential way out of poverty. The gap in 
education between men and women highlights gender inequalities 
 
The results suggest that the hotspots of low education and gender differences do generally coincide with 
the areas of poor food security outcomes (e.g., north-eastern Afar, and many parts of the Somali region). 
Notably, we find that education is generally higher for men in areas where conflict is limited within the 
Somali region (Figure 9). In some of these areas, however, the gender gap is substantial, with women having 
on average at least 1.5 years of education less than men. These areas, coloured in dark red, indicate specific 
spots where investment toward improving education with an explicit gender lens could help mitigating the 
impact of the climate security nexus. 
Hotspots of multiple climate security risks 
The dry-hot and food insecure areas within conflict areas tend to occur in border regions with other 
countries (e.g., Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti). We highlight the following areas where harsh climate 
conditions, conflict, food insecurity co-occur, with a number of socio-economic drivers (see Figure 11) 
• The north-eastern part of the Afar regions, encompassing the woredas of Elidar, Dubti, Mile, and 
Afambo. 
• The north (Ayisha and Shinile woredas), eastern (Danot, Warder, Shilabo, Kebridehar, Denan, Shekosh, 
Gunagado, Aware, Gashamo), and southern (Dolo Odo, Filtu, Moyale) parts of the Somali region. 
• The Gulomekeda and Erob woredas in Tigray –both bordering with Eritrea 
In these areas, we find  
(i) high (>25%) prevalence of stunting, wasting and underweight children,  
(ii) low levels (< 3 years) of education for men and large gaps (>1.5 years) between men and women, 
(iii) low levels of agricultural productivity (NPP < 2,500 kg-C/ha/year), high NPP variability (coefficient 
of variation > 15%), and high (up to 75% or more) shares of pasture area. 
Figure 9. Inequality hotspots and the conflict–food insecurity–climate nexus. The colour code of the small map on the left 










Figure 10. Low productivity hotspots (top map) and the conflict–food insecurity–climate nexus (bottom map). The colour 
code of the small map on the left follows Figure 7. Dark grey areas have no conflict reported according to ACLED.  
 
Figure 11. Hotspots of undernutrition, inequality and low productivity (map on the right) and the conflict–food insecurity–
climate nexus (map on the left). The colour code of the small map on the left follows Figure 7. Dark grey areas have no conflict 






The climate security nexus in the CADC countries 
Summary of findings for CADC countries 
(1) Two main impact pathways link climate to conflict, the agriculture losses pathway captures the 
and the natural resources pathways.  
(2) Climate exacerbates existing household level risks and insecurities that can increase the likelihood 
and intensity of conflict. In other words, we find evidence that climate is a threat multiplier14. In El 
Salvador, the analysis shows that climate exacerbates household level food insecurity, poverty and 
inequality; it reduced income and increases agricultural production costs, which in turn increase the 
likelihood and intensity of conflicts.  
(3) In addition to climate induced insecurities, there exist other important household level predictors 
of conflict, such as age, education, and gender of the head of the household, ethnicity, access to 
electricity and location.  
(4) The climate security nexus – the way climate, socio-economic and political risks and insecurities 
are linked to each other – differs across countries and conflict clusters. In El Salvador, the climate 
security nexus is characterized by the combination of ENSO effects and mid-summer drought intensity 
(ecological system), higher household dependency ratio, youth unemployment, agricultural income, 
accessibility, inability to meet basic needs, wealth (socio-economic system) and diversity of conflicts 
(political system) at national level. In Guatemala15, the climate security nexus is characterized by the 
ENSO effect and MSD duration (ecological system), food security, ability to meet basic needs, lack of 
education and limited access to alternative sources of income (socio-economic system) and number of 
conflicts (political system). In Honduras, the climate security nexus is characterized by MSD magnitude 
duration and ENSO effect (ecological system), cropping area and access to alternative sources of income 
(socio-economic system) and number of conflicts and diversity of conflict actors (political system).  
(5) There exist “climate insecurity hotspots” at sub-national level where high level of climate 
variability, conflict intensity and diversity co-occur with other existing socio-economic insecurities. In El 
Salvador, vulnerability hotspots tend to cover border areas (with both Honduras and Guatemala), and 
though these areas do not show high conflict, they show high prevalence of stunting. In Guatemala, 
particular attention should be given to the rural and peri-urban areas around Guatemala City, which 
show high conflict occurrence while at the same time being socially vulnerable. We also highlight the 
subsistence farming areas in Huehuetenango, Quiché, and Baja Verapaz, where social vulnerability is 
high and climate conditions can exacerbate this vulnerability. In Honduras, the southern areas 
(Choluteca department) show significant social and biophysical vulnerability, while also showing 
moderate to high conflict. In these areas, we find occurrence of poorly productive staple crop systems, 
combined with high accessibility to mining concessions and some presence of cash crops (cotton, 
coffee). We also highlight the areas of western Honduras (Copán, Intibucá, Lempira) where nutritional 
insecurity is high, but conflict has low intensity and diversity. 
 
 
14 Note that for both Guatemala and Honduras we could not run household level analyses due to lack of suitable 
data.  




Qualifying the climate security nexus in the CADC countries – an impact pathway 
analysis 
Impact pathway analysis 
To reveal the linkages between climate, food security and conflict in the CADC, we identify potential 
impact pathways through which climate can exacerbate security risks. Socio-political instability is 
driven by a complex web of interactions linking many different actors and aspects of society which can 
be looked at from different hierarchical levels, such as the community, regional, national, and 
international levels. Figure 12 below suggests few possible pathways and interactions, drawn from the 
existing evidence of the climate-security nexus in the CADC countries16. The following paragraphs will 
describe two main pathways:  
1 Agriculture losses pathway: Climate induced food insecurity and poverty, due to declining 
agricultural yields, income and employment opportunities, reduces the opportunity costs of joining 
armed groups, of especially young and unskilled men and women, and leads to forced migration, 
which due to population pressure, structural inequalities and lack of adequate social protection 
systems in the destination areas, creates favourable conditions for the recruitment of vulnerable 
people into criminal groups and increases the risk of violence and conflicts.  
2 Natural resources pathway: Natural resource scarcity due to irregular seasons and weather 
patterns, coupled with precarious economic status, extreme poverty, inequality, and food 
insecurity increases the competition over natural resources, especially land, increase deforestation 
and favours the insurgence of tensions and potentially conflicts over the acquisition of titles and 
rights regarding the use and access to natural resources.  
Previous literature has found that climate variability (irregular seasons and precipitation events) have 
increasingly occurred in the CADC countries. Similarly, extreme events, such as floods and droughts, 
have significantly increased and are expected to further increase in the near future. Climate can 
remarkably affect agricultural productivity, increase incidence of pests and diseases (such as coffee 
rust) and exacerbate insecurities when major staple and cash crops, such as maize and coffee, 
respectively are affected. These impacts could translate in reduced income, increased food insecurity 
and poverty (FAO 2017; Magrin et al. 2014). 
Climate variability also negatively influences job availability in the agricultural sector, as the demand 
for on-farm labour decreases, and negatively impacts the profits of off-farm workers (e.g., street 
sellers, retailers). The combination of decreased agricultural productivity with a lack of access to 
markets can lead to unfair pricing of the affected production output. The negative impacts of climate 
variability include reduced agricultural livelihood conditions and food insecurity, which may push 
people to migrate and become more susceptible to the recruitment into organized crime groups. This 
dynamic has been found in CADC countries, where extended climate variability and extreme events 
 




coupled with the lack of economic opportunities has been found to facilitate the recruitment of young 
people to criminal organizations (Delgado 2020). 
The gender dimensions of these climate-related security risks have been poorly explored (Abdenur 
2020). CADC societies are permeated by remarkable patterns of gender discrimination and inequality, 
with women and girls having unequal access to basic public services, formal labour markets and 
decision-making processes at all levels. Moreover, violence against women and girls is a widespread 
phenomenon in both urban and rural areas, and Guatemala and El Salvador account for the highest 
rates of gender-based violence (GBV) in the CA region (Musalo and Bookey 2013). Structural 
conditions, such as inequalities and social norms, have made women and girls, especially those living 
in rural and indigenous communities, particularly susceptible to climate shocks and associated security 
risks  (UNEP et al. 2020). CADC rural men and women  are highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture 
and natural resources and, therefore, climate variability and land degradation have directly affected 
their ability to achieve and maintain food and water security (Abdenur 2020; Fraga 2020). The 
women's capacity to absorb and recover from climate shocks have been further hindered by gender 
norms and discriminatory practices that have led rural and indigenous women to have unequal access 
to agricultural land and technical assistance (OXFAM-International 2020). This economic vulnerability 
combined with the high levels of GBV and domestic violence women experience during and following 
extreme weather events (UNFPA 2010), have created a negative vicious climate security cycle, 
undermining their adaptive capacities and constraining their livelihood options, which in turn have 
reinforced sexual violence and discrimination (UNEP et al. 2020). 
Finally, natural resource scarcity is  a widely recognized source of conflict, although under debate in 
its impact on political security when taken in isolation from important socio-economic and political 
factors (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Homer-Dixon 1994; Theisen 2008). However, the link between 
climate, natural resource scarcity and conflict  in CADC countries is not fully investigated in the 
environmental security literature (Delgado 2020; O’Toole 2017). Existing evidence shows that climate 
impacts can exacerbate soil degradation, water scarcity and induce deforestation in CADC, and that 
increasing competition over resources, exacerbated by the increasing acquisition of land affecting the 
indigenous population in Central America are important factors in the prediction of conflicts in the 





























Quantifying the climate security nexus in the CADC countries 
Three countries were analysed in the CADC, namely, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Over the period 
for which data were available (2018–2020) in the ACLED database, we find that conflict intensity (measured 
by the total number of events) is generally greater in Honduras, followed by Guatemala and finally by El 
Salvador (Figure 13).  
In the three countries gangs and non-state armed groups are by far the leading violent actors, as they are 
responsible for virtually all the battles (consisting solely of armed clashes) and violence against civilians 
(mostly attacks). In the vast majority of cases, armed clashes occur between two different gangs or armed 
groups, whereas only seldom the military or police are involved. Both armed clashes and attacks against 
civilians take place in different areas of the countries, though they tend to have a greater concentration 
around the major cities (especially for Honduras and Guatemala). The average number of fatalities per 
events for these two conflict types (battles, and violence against civilians) ranges between 1 (Guatemala) 
and 1.3 (Honduras).  
Protests are also very frequently reported in the ACLED database for the CADC. Protests are primarily 
peaceful, and hardly lead to deaths. Overall, protests are more common in Honduras, followed by 

























































































































































Guatemala Honduras El Salvador
Figure 13. Overview of reported conflict events and fatalities in the CADC per event type, period 2018–2020. Data from 
the ACLED database. Letters in the x-axis refer to the event type as follows, B: battle, VAC: violence against civilians, P: 





We identify 4 clusters for Guatemala, 3 for Honduras, and 3 for El Salvador (Figure 14). In Guatemala, the 
four clusters are formed primarily by intensity (Extreme, High, Moderate and Limited), whereas in El 
Salvador the clusters are formed by diversity of event types and actors (high, moderate and low diversity). 
For Honduras, the three identified clusters structure the country in terms of both intensity and diversity 
(low diversity – low intensity; moderate diversity – low intensity; and high diversity – high intensity). 
Country-specific results can be summarised as follows: 
• In Guatemala, the “extreme” violence cluster is composed by a single municipality (San José, in the 
Peten department). While the total number of events and fatalities in San José is not the highest of 
Guatemala, the intensity of conflict per total population is by far greater than the rest of the country. 
Apart from San José, the entire Peten department experiences significant violence. Peten is mostly 
classified in the “Moderate” violence cluster. The characteristics of the Peten department make it very 
prone to violence, as (i) it largely lacks government presence; (ii) has large natural areas which armed 
groups and gangs can use as shelter from police and other gangs; (iii) has a border with Mexico which 
make it attractive for narcotraffic routes; and (iv) it has substantial ethnic diversity and has historically 
suffered from colonization and violence towards ethnic groups (Hurtado Paz Y Paz, 2010).The high 
violence cluster of Guatemala encompasses the areas immediately surrounding Guatemala City, 
whereas the limited violence cluster extends through most of the productive highlands. 
• In Honduras, the high diversity and high intensity cluster encompasses the main cities (Tegucigalpa and 
San Pedro Sula, and their surroundings) in addition to the western part of the Gracias a Dios department 
(Brus Laguna municipality). This area in general experiences a similar situation to San José in 
Guatemala, whereby lack of government presence and low accessibility and infrastructure allow for 
gangs and narcotraffic groups to establish operations. Consistent with this, strategic developments by 
either the Honduras police and military against gangs (or vice versa) are the main sources of both 
conflict events and deaths. The low intensity but moderate diversity covers important areas of the dry 
corridor of Honduras (e.g., Choluteca department), whereas the low diversity - low intensity cluster 
covers is large and covers most of the rural areas of the country. 
• In El Salvador, violence is distributed relatively uniformly in terms of intensity, but varies substantially 
in terms of the diversity of conflict types and actors involved. Since gangs and illegal armed groups are 
the main actors, this means that the low diversity cluster is dominated by specific gangs, which fight 
between themselves and against government forces (police and military). These areas are widespread 
across El Salvador, and cover many rural areas where poverty is high. By contrast, high diversity areas 
are located around San Salvador, but also occupy the Ahuachapan and Sonsonate departments. In 
these areas, many gangs and armed groups are present, fighting for survival and territory between 
themselves, but also with significant push back from the Salvadorian military and police. Moderate 
diversity areas are generally in between high and low diversity areas, and likely represent transitional 











The climate security nexus at household level  
The results of the analyses are summarised and presented in Figure 15. They confirm our hypothesis that 
climate does exacerbate existing insecurities and increases the risks of conflicts in El Salvador. Conflicts are 
defined as any type of violence, conflict, tensions, and related socio-political co-variate insecurities affecting 
a group of individuals in certain geographical area. More specifically, our estimates show that climate 
induced17 food insecurities, inequality, poverty, and increased agricultural costs increase the likelihood of 
the occurrence of conflicts at municipality level. But these results differ significantly depending on the type 
and diversity of conflicts (Figure 15).  
First, we find that climate induced food insecurity exacerbates the occurrence and intensity of conflicts at 
national level and across conflict clusters. Following Moltedo et al., (2014), an increase in the proportion of 
income allocated to food is a signal of decreased food security. We find that an increase of food insecurity, 
as affected by climate, has a positive effect on our conflict dependent variables. This result in line with 
previous literature (Berazneva and Lee 2013; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Koren and Bagozzi 2016) 
who find robust evidence that food insecurity is associated with the presence of violent conflicts, the 
likelihood of joining armed groups and increased political repression. In our analysis we find strong evidence 
that the climate-food insecurity-conflict nexus exists, and that the strongest and more consistent effect of 
climate induced food insecurity is observed in the moderate conflict cluster (purple areas in the map in 
Figure 14). This cluster includes municipalities where conflict diversity is likely to intensify towards the 
 
17 Here we use the term induced in a very loose way, as we acknowledge that there are many other factors that 
drive food insecurity. Our assumption, which is validated by our statistical tests is, however, that climate 








Figure 14. Geographic distribution of conflict clusters in CADC countries. Light grey areas have no conflict reported 





future. Here we find that food insecurity increases the likelihood of the occurrence of any conflict event 
and the intensity of battles, riots, and overall conflict events at municipality level.  
Our results also show that inequality is a strong predictor of climate induced conflicts. Inequality has 
historically been a major risk in El Salvador. Despite a recent improvement, El Salvador remains the second 
most unequal country in Latin America and the Caribbean(The World Bank 2021) . Economic inequality has 
often been found as an important predictor of conflict and overall political instability (Alesina & Perotti, 
1996; Boyce, 1996; T. Gurr, 1970 on El Salvador; and also on Latin America, K. Booth, 1991; Nafziger & 
Auvinen, 1997b; Wickham-Crowley, 2018)). More recently, some authors have challenged these views 
claiming that high inequality does not necessarily translates into political instability. Instead, it is important 
to unveil those mechanisms that “enable a relatively peaceable durable inequality to turn into a violent 
conflict” (Cramer 2003). There is quite strong evidence that climate impacts could exacerbated these 
mechanisms, as it is found to significantly exacerbate economic inequality (Pacillo et al. 2020). In El 
Salvador, we also find robust evidence that inequality is exacerbated by climate and that this influences the 
risk and intensity of conflict events at municipality level in high, moderate and limited conflict clusters. The 
high conflict cluster is mainly located around San Salvador, but also occupy the Ahuachapan and Sonsonate 
departments. In these areas, many gangs and armed groups are present, fighting for the control over 
territories between themselves, with significant push back from the Salvadorian military and police. On the 
other hand, the low diversity cluster is dominated by specific gangs, which fight between themselves and 
against government forces (police and military). These areas are widespread across El Salvador, and cover 
many rural areas where poverty is high. The moderate conflict cluster is somehow in between and are areas 
where most likely conflicts could intensify in the future. Across all the conflict clusters, we find that climate 
induced inequality strongly increases the likelihood of any conflicts, number of overall conflicts events, 
numbers of battles and riots.  
Another important climate security risk for El Salvador is agriculture, more specifically the costs associated 
with the agricultural activities. We find that the increase of agricultural costs, as affected by climate, is 
positively and strongly associated with the likelihood and intensity of conflicts. Past suggests that climate 
has had a strong negative impact on agriculture in El Salvador. For instance, due to a long drought period 
in 2014 and in 2018, El Salvador lost 90% and 55% of its bean harvest, respectively, largely increasing prices 
of the staple crop driving many households into severe food and nutrition insecurity (Calvo-Solano et al. 
2018). Other studies also suggest that a decrease of agricultural productivity, and a consequent, lower 
demand of agricultural labour, is associated with higher conflict density (Barnett and Adger 2007; Guardado 
and Pennings 2020; Kelley et al. 2015; Raleigh and Kniveton 2012).  
Finally, our impact pathway analysis suggests that a reduced agricultural productivity can push people out 
of rural areas in search for better economic opportunities and lowers their opportunity costs to join criminal 
groups. Our results overall confirm this hypothesis in the national level analysis. At cluster level, we observe 
non-consistent results, as agricultural costs and income are not significant or negatively correlated with the 
risk and intensity of conflicts. A negative correlation can be explained by the fact that this variable might be 
capturing the value of the land. A land that required high expenses on inputs (fertilizers, soil conservation 
practices, etc.) might not be regarded as valuable compared to land which requires less inputs (i.e. not so 
degraded or eroded) and therefore not competed for among gangs. On the other hand, higher costs and 
incomes are also associate to larger agricultural lands, therefore potentially capturing the economic status 
of the household. If so, the higher the cost the higher the land size and, consequently, the higher the wealth 
of the farmer.  If this is the case, past literature and our impact pathway analysis suggest that the increase 




There is a wealth of literature that show the link between poverty and conflicts (Collier et al. 2003; Collier, 
Bank, and Hoeffler 2002; Djankov and Reynal-Querol 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; T. Gurr 1970; Jakobsen, 
de Soysa, and Jakobsen 2013; Muller and Seligson 1987; Sambanis 2004). Conflicts are often seen as a 
consequence the “failure of economic development” (Collier et al. 2003) or a “problem of the poor” 
(Sambanis 2002)18. These studies find that recruitment in rebel groups constitutes a common coping 
strategy for the poorest, especially in presence of weak states and institutions (Fearon and Laitin 2003)19. 
Our results show that an increase in poverty, as affected by climate, increases the likelihood and intensity 
of conflicts, including battles and riots, at national and conflict cluster level. Some authors suggests that 
governance can effectively mitigate, offset and potential reverse the link between poverty and insecurity 
(Ross, Ross, and L. 2004; Thies 2010). We find that poverty has a deterrent effect in the moderate cluster 
level. Also, comparing this cluster to the multi-dimensional poverty distribution map (Figure 16) shows that 
most of the municipalities have a much higher level of poverty that the rest of the country, suggesting a 
higher level of structural deprivation in this cluster. Some authors suggest (e.g. Goodhand, 2001) that “it is 
more likely to be the transiently poor, rather than the chronically poor who rebel”. People who experience 
high level of multidimensional deprivation might not be able to organize protests, or look for better 
opportunities in criminal activities, as they tend to be the most passive group in the society.  
Finally, among other drivers of conflicts our results show that land tenure, age, sex and education of the 
household head, household size and rurality have a significant correlation with the type and intensity of 
conflicts. These results suggest that the risk and intensity of conflicts increases in those municipalities where 
household are headed by younger, female20 and less educated heads; where households size is above 
average, and they located in the urban areas. Land tenure is also found to be a strong deterrent of conflict. 
Our results show that land ownership significantly and strongly reduces the risk and intensity of conflicts. 
These results are almost exclusively observed in the national level analysis, but they are not consistent 
across the conflict clusters, apart from land ownership, which is strongly significant also in moderate conflict 
clusters. Interestingly, none of these drivers are significant in the limited conflict clusters, suggesting that 






18 But as in the case of food security, these studies do not provide any details regarding those mechanisms, 
such as climate, that could exacerbate poverty and render it a significant driver of insecurity (Collier, Bank, and 
Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Jakobsen, de Soysa, and Jakobsen 2013; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 
2004).  
19 In addition to poverty, there are a lot of other factors that are associated with recruitment beyond poverty, 
including identity, ideology, and mistreatment by government.  
20 In interpreting these results, one should consider that oftentimes women are often left behind and not able 
to flee insecure areas as much as older and more educated men are. Also, in areas of high conflict intensity, it 
might be more likely that women have lost their husbands due to violence or temporarily separated due to 

























Figure 15. Heat maps of results of the econometric analysis quantifying the climate impacts on conflicts via the exacerbation of existing insecurities in El Salvador, at country level (panel A), in 
the high conflict cluster (panel B), in the moderate conflict cluster (panel C) and limited conflict cluster (panel D). Note (2); the sign (+/-) indicate the direction of the effect of the specific driver 
or control factor and the colour (a scale of red) indicates whether the direction of the causality is in line with expectations and reflects the strength of the statistical significance of such effect. 
The stronger and more consistent results are those with +++ or --- and in a dark red coloured cell. Conflict data used for this analysis were extracted from the official Twitter account of the El 













The large-scale climate security nexus: cascading risks in the climate security nexus 
The analyses presented thus far show how the climate security nexus occur across low scale drivers 
that are estimated at household level. However, there exist some important drivers that can only be 
observed at larger scale, at municipality or district level.  
We run network analyses for El Salvador, at country and conflict cluster level, and for Guatemala and 
Honduras at country level only21. The results for El Salvador are presented in Figure 17 where the purple 
nodes represent climate variables, whilst the green nodes represent socio-economic variables. Conflict is 
represented in yellow22. Table 2 summarises the results of the analyses for all the countries, listing the main 
large drivers and their relationship with climate and security. 
In El Salvador, the results for the country level analysis show that the strong prevalence of high youth 
unemployment and lack of economic opportunities is central to the socio-economic status (poverty, wealth 
index, food security ratio) in El Salvador (Figure 17). Mid-summer drought intensity and ENSO events are 
key factors which determine the food security status (high prevalence of food insecurity) and wealth index, 
through employment in the agricultural sectors (agricultural income and household members’ occupation). 
Accessibility (time required to travel to healthcare facilities) is strongly linked with affected area which in 
turn are closely associated with conflict (specifically fatalities). This analysis therefore suggests that 
agricultural related indicators (income from agriculture) as well as the number of unemployed youth, form 
the interface between climate (El Niño Southern Oscillation- ENSO and mid-summer drought) and conflict 
events, represented by four key variables – fatalities, type richness, subtype richness and actor1 richness. 
In the high conflict diversity cluster (Table 2 and Figure S4 in the Appendix), forming one of the most densely 
clustered networks, conflict is linked to socio-economic vulnerability or status (wealth index, household 
income, food security ratio) and directly to sources of income from agriculture. These in turn are both tightly 
connected to extreme climate events (ENSO and mid-summer drought). Accessibility (time required to travel 
to healthcare facilities) is strongly linked with affected area as well as nightlights which in turn are strongly 
associated with conflict (specifically fatalities). In the moderate conflict diversity cluster, FSR (high 
prevalence of food insecurity) is linked strongly to household income (hh_income). Household income is 
central to wealth and poverty indicators (WI- wealth index, poverty, unemployed youth). Accessibility (time 
required to travel to healthcare facilities) is strongly linked with conflict (specifically fatalities). Finally, in 
the low conflict diversity cluster, FSR (high prevalence of food insecurity) is linked strongly to household 
income (hh_income). Accessibility (time required to travel to healthcare facilities) is strongly linked with 
affected area which is strongly associated with conflict (specifically fatalities and actor1_richness). 
Household income is central to wealth and poverty indicators (WI- wealth index, poverty). These are driven 
by an array of other socioeconomic variables which are linked to conflict. 
 
 
21 We could not run the analysis at cluster level for Guatemala and Honduras due to the limited sample size of 
the observations available for these two countries.  
22 The network graphs of the cluster level analysis for El Salvador and the country level graphs for Guatemala 





The results of the network analysis at country level for Guatemala show that conflicts are a product of a 
vulnerable socio-economic situation (FCS – high prevalence of food insecurity), exacerbated by extreme 
climate cases (ENSO and mid-summer drought) on staple crops (rice, maize). The socioeconomic 
vulnerability in this pathway is further emphasized with strong links to alternate illegal or seasonal work 
(deforestation which may indicate illegal logging in Guatemala and/or agricultural expansion and mining 
concessions). Conflicts in this analysis are represented by six key variables – fatalities, events, type richness, 
subtype richness, actor1 richness and actor2 richness. In this network, conflict is heavily influenced by the 
prevalence of unmet basic social needs (prevalence of insufficient food consumption- FCS, safe drinking 
water- SDWater, availability of healthcare per capita- Phealth). Participatory involvement of people in the 
decision-making process of policies that will affect basic needs is a priority as to address conflict we need 
to address the lack of basic necessities that are driving these outbreaks.  These indicators have the greatest 
strength or centrality in the network and are therefore very strongly linked to climate pressures (ENSO, 
Mid-summer drought duration), valuable natural resources (crop yields) and conflict. The network flow 
indicates that large scale climate events, i.e., the duration of mid-summer drought and strong anomalies in 
temperature and precipitation from ENSO events are directly impactful on valuable natural resources (rice 
and maize production). These natural resources are then linked to prevalence of insufficient food and the 
distance to mining and deforestation concessions. This may indicate that once food security has been 
compromised by extreme climate events, vulnerable groups may turn to other sources of income and be 
more exposed or inclined to conflict events. 
Finally, in Honduras the analysis shows that FCS – high prevalence of food insecurity is linked directly to net 
flow (migration) and msd_mag (midsummer drought magnitude). Conflict is revolved around areas with 





large population density (population) which in turn has a confirmatory connection to the prevalence of 
nightlights and housing. Conflict is represented by six key variables – fatalities, events, type richness, 
subtype richness, actor1 richness, and actor2 richness. Subtype richness shows a direct link to Enso effect. 
Enso effect largely influences an array of other socioeconomic variables. The remaining conflict variables 
are linked to population size. The population resulting in conflict outbreaks are in more densely populated 
areas indicated by a large number of nightlights as well as housing (rural dwellings built with long-lasting 
material) and access to safe drinking water (SDwater). 
 Key intermediary socio-
economic drivers  
This describes those 
drivers which have the 
strongest link with 
conflict in the network 
 
Climate factors that 
affect these outcomes 
Describes climate 
drivers that are in the 
near vicinity of the key 
socio-econ drivers or 
that are directly linked 
to conflict 
Other (less relevant) 
socio-economic factors 
Describes any other 
factors that might be at 
play, but of less 
importance in driving 
conflict (on the periphery 
of the network) 
Relationships with food 
security and nutrition 
Answers “where in the 
network is food security?” 





- Income from 
agriculture 
- Accessibility  
- ENSO 
- Mid-summer drought 
Intensity 
- Unmet basic needs 
- Wealth indicators 
- Food security is linked 
strongly to household 
income 
Cluster 1 – 
high 
conflict 
- Wealth Index 
- Income from 
agriculture 
- Accessibility 
- Total amount of 
precipitation 
- ENSO 
- Unsatisfied basic needs 
- Poverty 
- Food security is linked 






- Wealth Index 




- Mid-summer drought 
related indicators 
- Food security  
- Income from 
agriculture 
- Food security is linked 
strongly to household 
income 
 
Cluster 3 – 
limited 
conflict 
- Number of 
unemployed youth 
- Accessibility 
- Mid-summer drought 
intensity 
- Unmet basic needs 
- Wealth indicators 
 
- Food security is linked 
strongly to household 
income 
Guatemala     
Country 
(All) 
- SD Water (Safe 
Drinking water) 
- Population size 
- ENSO effect 
- Mid-summer drought 
duration 
- Food security 
- Unmet basic needs - 
Education 
- Access to alternative 
sources of income 
(mining concessions, 
deforestation)  
FCS (food insecurity) is 
largely connected to 
extreme climate (ENSO 
effect) as well as illegal or 
seasonal work (access to 
deforestation). FCS is also 
connected to staple food 
production (yield rice) 
Honduras     
Country 
(All) 
- Permanent fixed assets 
(rural dwelling built with 
long-lasting materials) 
- Unmet basic social 
needs 
- ENSO effect (direct 
link) 
- Mid-summer drought 
duration 
- Cropping areas 
- Access to alternative 
sources of income 
FCS (food insecurity) is 
largely connected to 
illegal or seasonal work 
(net flow) as well as to 




Table 2. Main large-scale drivers and their relationship with climate and conflict identified in the network analyses at country level 





Mapping the climate security nexus  
Climate, conflict, and food security hotspots 
The Central American Mid-Summer Drought (MSD) is likely the most important driver of agricultural 
productivity and food insecurity in the CADC. The MSD is a dry period with a duration of approximately two 
weeks which typically occurs in the ‘postrera’ season (August–November). In extremely dry seasons (e.g., 
when ENSO is in a positive phase) the MSD can last for longer than two weeks, severely hindering crop and 
livestock productivity, and often leading to food insecurity. The MSD is characterised using three different 
metrics: (i) intensity or the average daily rainfall during the period, (ii) duration, and (iii) magnitude or the 
minimum 30-day running mean precipitation. We use the long-term (1981–2019) means of these three 
indicators and the influence of ENSO in the local precipitation to develop climate groups within the three 
CADC countries of interest (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador). 
Our analysis identified six distinct climate groups in the CADC, which arise as a combination of the duration, 
intensity, and magnitude of the MSD (Figure 18). Four groups show short duration of the MSD with different 
levels of drought (ranging from not significant to extreme), and two other groups show a longer MSD with 
either moderate or extreme drought. These groups occur in different frequencies in the region, with the 
‘long MSD with extreme drought’ occurring only in Honduras, and the rest occurring both in Honduras and 
Guatemala. In El Salvador, we find only two groups, namely, ‘short MSD with mild drought’ and ‘long MSD 
with moderate drought’.  
When intersecting these climate groups with the conflict clusters, the following findings become apparent: 
• In Guatemala, climates with short MSD dominate, but they vary widely in intensity across the country 
and within conflict clusters. The extreme and high conflict clusters are both dominated (100 and 82% 
of municipalities, respectively) by climates with short MSD but extreme drought. In the moderate 
conflict cluster, conversely, these short MSD and extreme drought conditions occur only in 5% of the 
municipalities, but short MSD with mild or insignificant drought are more dominant (32.5% in each 
case). The limited conflict cluster, on the other hand, shows 39% of municipalities in the short MSD 
with extreme drought, followed by short MSD with mild drought (27%). 
• In Honduras, long and extremely dry MSD conditions dominate in all conflict clusters, but especially so 
in the high diversity – high intensity cluster (75% municipalities). As conflict intensity and diversity 
reduce, so does the dominance of this type of climate, with 43.3% municipalities having long and 
extremely dry MSD in the moderate diversity – low intensity conflict cluster, and 27.7% municipalities 
in the low diversity – low intensity conflict cluster. 
• El Salvador shows the most favourable climate conditions. Across the conflict clusters, short MSD with 
mild drought occur in 95% of the municipalities with moderate conflict diversity, in 86% of the 
municipalities with high conflict diversity, and in 62% of the municipalities with low conflict diversity. 
Food insecurity groups (Figure 19) were developed by spatial clustering of five variables, namely, the food 
consumption score (FCS), prevalence of stunting, prevalence of underweight, and prevalence of wasting. 
Due to the spatial scale of the migration data, we also include migration in the food insecurity groupings. 
These groups are developed to provide a general overview of the food insecurity situation in these 
countries. Contrary to Ethiopia, in the case of the CADC, we refrain from overlaying these groups with the 











Figure 18. Climate groups in the CADC (a), their intersection with conflict clusters for Guatemala (b), Honduras (c), and El Salvador 
(d). For panel (c), HdHi: high diversity, high intensity; MdLi: moderate diversity, low intensity; LdLi: low diversity, low intensity. 
For panel (d), Hd: high diversity, Md: moderate diversity, and Ld: low diversity. Dark grey areas have no conflict reported 

















In Guatemala and Honduras, the food insecurity groups are formed as a result of the spatial variation in 
the FCS as well as in the nutritional indicators, whereas in El Salvador all indicators except the prevalence 
of stunting present only limited spatial variation. Generally speaking, the areas of highest conflict in 
Guatemala (surroundings of Guatemala City) have the lowest food insecurity. By contrast, many of the 
areas of the biophysical dry corridor, where conflict is limited but the MSD is short and intense, show high 
food insecurity conditions. Virtually all areas of moderate conflict show high food insecurity. For 
Honduras, high food insecurity occurs in areas of high and moderate conflict diversity and intensity, and 
to a lesser degree in areas of low conflict diversity and intensity. It is noteworthy that in Honduras the 
most extreme food insecurity conditions occur in areas of low conflict and relatively favorable climate 
conditions (short MSD with mild or moderate drought). Finally, for El Salvador, we note that the highest 
rates of stunting occur primarily in the low conflict diversity cluster, and within these in areas of more 
favorable climates. 
Undernutrition and inequality within climate, conflict and food security hotspots 
To analyse nutritional outcomes within conflict areas we determine hotspot areas for wasting, stunting and 
underweight prevalence through spatial analysis. Figure 20 shows the results of this process for 
undernutrition and Figure 21 for inequality. The results identified the following hotspots (dark brown 
municipalities in Figure 20 and blue, orange and purple in Figure 21): 
• In Guatemala, the departments of Baja Verapaz, Huehuetenango and Quiché show the greatest 
nutritional insecurity problems.  
• In Honduras, high nutritional insecurity is found in the west towards the departments of departments 
of Copán, Intibucá, Lempira and Ocotepeque. Undernutrition is also a significant problem in specific 
pockets within the department of Madre de Dios (eastern Honduras).  
• In El Salvador, nutritional insecurity problems are concentrated toward the borders with both Honduras 
and Guatemala, suggesting a likely relationship between these and migration. 
a) b)
c)
Figure 19. Spatial variation in food insecurity in the CADC for Guatemala (a), Honduras (b), and El Salvador (c). For panel 
(b), FI: food insecurity, and NI: nutritional insecurity. The names of the groups are given per country based on the values of 




• In many of the areas in which undernutrition hotspots are identified, we also see inequality being a 
problem (Figure 21). Particular attention should be given to western Guatemala, western Honduras, 














Figure 20. Undernutrition hotspots in the CADC for Guatemala (a), Honduras (b), and El Salvador (c). Dark grey areas are 
those where no conflict has been reported. For reference, Figure 30 shows the spatial distribution of the conflict–climate 
nexus. Dark grey areas have no conflict reported according to ACLED. 
 
Figure 21. Inequality hotspots in the CADC for Guatemala (a), Honduras (b), and El Salvador (c). Dark grey areas are those 
where no conflict has been reported. For reference, Fig. 30 shows the spatial distribution of the conflict–climate nexus. 





Agricultural and natural ecosystem productivity within climate, conflict and food security 
hotspots 
Hotspots where low agricultural or ecosystem productivity exist are determined based on the hypothesis 
that where these agricultural or ecosystem resources are limited, it is more likely that competition for 
resources will lead to migration and conflict. 
Agricultural and natural ecosystem productivity is assessed using six different variables: (i) the upper bound 
of net primary productivity (NPP); (ii) the stability of NPP (coefficient of variation); (iii) the total harvested 
area for staple crops (bean, maize, and rice); and (iv) the yield gaps of these staple crops (bean, maize, rice). 
Areas of low NPP, low NPP stability, high cultivation density of staple crops and high yield gaps of these 
crops are flagged as hotspots. Individual variable hotpots were aggregated to produce a map of combined 
(count) of productivity issues (Figure 22). We use the count given the relatively number of hotspot 
combinations between the variables that arise across the geography of the CADC. 
 
The analysis shows that: 
• In Guatemala, low productivity hotspots are mainly concentrated across the subsistence farming area 
(south of Quiche, Huehuetenango, and departments of Chimaltenango, Totonicapan, Solola and 
Quetzaltenango), and to a lesser extent in the south.  
• In Honduras, we find hotspots toward the south (Fonseca Gulf) but also in the west, where 
undernutrition and inequality are also problematic.  









Figure 22. Low productivity hotspots in the CADC for Guatemala (a), Honduras (b), and El Salvador (c). Dark grey areas are 
those where no conflict has been reported. For reference, Figure 30 shows the spatial distribution of the conflict–climate 





Access to other valuable resources within climate, conflict, and food security hotspots 
Valuable resources can also represent a source of conflict if groups with different interests fight for such 
resources (Figure 23). Here we analysed three key resources known to have significant impact on conflict 
in the CADC. These were (i) the accessibility (travel time) to mining concessions; (ii) the accessibility to 
deforestation; and (iii) the density of cash crops (coffee and cotton). We hypothesise that areas with greater 
access to mining and forest resources, as well as high density of cash crop cultivation are more likely leading 
to conflict since these areas are desired by many competing groups. 
 
Our results indicate that:  
• In Guatemala, high conflict areas are associated with high accessibility to mining concessions, and 
to a lesser extent the combination of mining and cash crops, and the combination of those with 
deforestation areas. In moderate conflict areas, we note more prevalence of deforestation access 
spots (Peten department) and cash crop presence (south).   
• A similar pattern is identified for Honduras, where high conflict and moderate conflict co-occur 
with mining and/or mining – cash crop density areas.   
• In El Salvador, high diversity conflict tends to co-occur near deforestation areas, whereas moderate 
conflict is more likely in areas of high cash crop cultivation. 
Hotspots of multiple insecurities combined 
We analysed the climate security nexus and its co-occurrence with food insecurity, undernutrition, 
inequality, agricultural productivity, and valuable resource access. Combining all these dimensions reveals 
overall hotspot areas (Figure 24) in different locations of the conflict–climate nexus. Here we use the count 
of dimensions given that the number of hotspot combinations arising from the four dimensions is relatively 
large (16 in total). We specifically highlight the following, 
Figure 23. Hotspots of access to valuable resources in the CADC for Guatemala (a), Honduras (b), and El Salvador (c). 





• In Guatemala, particular attention should be given to the rural and peri-urban areas around Guatemala 
City, which show high conflict occurrence while at the same time being socially vulnerable. We also 
highlight the subsistence farming areas in Huehuetenango, Quiché, and Baja Verapaz, where social 
vulnerability is high and climate conditions can exacerbate this vulnerability. While these areas are 
classified as having only limited conflict, conflict is still prevalent. 
• In Honduras, the southern areas (Choluteca department) show significant social and biophysical 
vulnerability, while also showing moderate to high conflict. In these areas, we find occurrence of poorly 
productive staple crop systems, combined with high accessibility to mining concessions and some 
presence of cash crops (cotton, coffee). We also highlight the areas of western Honduras (Copán, 
Intibucá, Lempira) where nutritional insecurity is high, but conflict has low intensity and diversity. 
• In El Salvador, vulnerability hotspots tend to cover border areas (with both Honduras and Guatemala), 
and though these areas do not show high conflict, they show high prevalence of stunting. High conflict 
areas of El Salvador tend to be associated with access to deforestation, defined as the opportunity for 
groups to carry out deforestation activities outside the control of the authorities, whereas the 
moderate conflict cluster shows low agricultural productivity for staple crops, high density of cash 











Figure 24. Multi-dimensional hotspots overlaid on the conflict–food insecurity–climate nexus in CADC for Guatemala 
(a), Honduras (b), and El Salvador (c). Dark grey areas are those where no conflict has been reported. The values show 
the count of dimensions highlighted as hotspots from a total of four dimensions, namely, high undernutrition, 




How can WFP programming become more climate security sensitive? 
We have carried out a series of key informant interviews with representatives of different WFP divisions 
and teams to identify a set of priority areas needed to increase WFP programming sensitiveness to 
climate security concerns. The following sub-sections discuss the priority areas for the following WFP 
teams: Social protection, Nutrition, SAMS, School Feeding, Emergency operations, FFA and gender. Social 
Protection programming  
Social protection interventions are crucial in the mitigation of those existing risks and insecurities that 
climate and conflict can exacerbate. WFP work on social protection is strictly linked to national 
governments’ work. Its main role is in supporting national governments in creating or improving existing 
systems and schemes, such as safety nets, working on the government’s behalf only when directly invited 
on schemes that the government will take up in the near future. Therefore, WFP social protection 
programming in climate insecure setting should focus on three main priorities: 
1. Ensure equality and equity of access to food assistance and social protection schemes to the entire 
population. In area with high intensity of conflict, this can be done by: 1) separating humanitarian and 
development needs from the causes of conflicts; 2) keeping the advocacy focus on human rights and 
provision of technical assistance.  
In highly insecure area, WFP social protection interventions are difficult to implement. This is because WFP 
cannot take sides or decide to work in areas that are mostly populated by the opposition parties or by rebel 
organisations. Nonetheless, food assistance, humanitarian aid and equal access can be granted to the whole 
population if the discussion with the national government keeps a human rights angle, and it clearly focuses 
on the provision of specialised technical assistance. In highly unstable and conflict affected area, it is 
therefore important to separate between the humanitarian and development needs from the root cause 
of conflict. This approach proved highly successful in Sri Lanka, where despite a major conflict between the 
central government and the rebel groups, WFP has been able to provide food assistance effectively across 
the entire population. Furthermore, despite its limited role on root causes of conflict during emergencies, 
WFP plays an active role in post-conflict settings. Social protection advocacy efforts by WFP have been 
successful in addressing the main divide created by conflicts. For instance, in Myanmar, WFP has provided 
significant relief and built bridges across the different parties through humanitarian interventions.  
2. Ensure that social protection schemes are flexible enough to take into account the impact of the climate 
crisis by supporting the government in the adoption of a “Shock Responsive Social Protection” policy 
that includes the development of an effective early warning system and SOPs.  
WFP can work with government in making social protection schemes flexible and adaptable to the changing 
needs of the population. An example of the so called “Shock-Responsive Social Protection” can be found in 
Burkina Faso, where WFP has advocated for the inclusion of food security in the national policy as well as 
for the development of a scheme that is responsive to climate change impacts. Within this scheme, 
households are provided with a monthly cash transfer that becomes higher during those months that are 
known to be regularly hit by severe droughts, ensuring that their level of food security is kept constant 
throughout the year, despite the impact of climate on local productive assets. Furthermore, in areas where 
climate impacts are high, it is crucial to also advocate and strengthen early warning systems that trigger 
social protection schemes effectively throughout the year. Successful examples of this are the Dominican 
Republic, Madagascar and Uganda. In these countries, WFP has been working with the national 




policy. The Dominican Republic and Madagascar have already been able to institutionalise them and also 
active them during the COVID19 pandemic.  
3. Support national governments in unpacking the multi-dimensionalities and complexity of poverty and 
its linkages with the impacts of the climate crisis.   
WFP supports governments in mainstreaming climate issues in the national social protection policies. 
However, these advocacy efforts are often quite challenging as policies often focus on poverty, and usually 
without accounting for its multi-dimensionality or for its linkages with the climate crisis.  
Nutrition programming  
Our analysis also shows that nutrition insecurity can be exacerbated by climate and, in turn, increases the 
likelihood and intensity of conflicts. Acknowledging and mitigating the link between climate security and 
nutrition is critical to ensure that people living in harsher climatic and insecure areas can have regular and 
systematic access to nutritious food and diets. In WFP, nutrition interventions are cross-cutting, intersecting 
with multiple programmes, including gender. In climate insecure areas, WFP nutrition programming should 
focus on the following priorities: 
1. To effectively address nutritional needs of people living in climate insecure areas, integrated climate 
and nutrition analysis should be carried out during the design stage of both climate and nutrition 
interventions. 
An example of the type of nutrition analysis that could be used is the “Fill the nutrition gap” analysis, which 
uses qualitative and quantitative methods to understand the nutritional context, estimate food affordability 
in local settings and identify suitable interventions. Linking this with climate activities will be critical for 
building resilience of the most vulnerable. Although a fully-fledged integrated approach is not yet 
developed within WFP, in Tanzania Social Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC) approaches are used 
to ensure that the communities are aware of good nutrition principles but also that climate smart 
approaches are adopted. Similarly, WFP should ensure that nutrition is effective integrated into the peace 
and security programming. This tripartite dialogue between nutrition, climate and conflict should be 
initiated and institutionalised.  
2. In areas highly political insecure areas and/or with active conflicts, food assistance should be 
prioritised, while in presence of localised and low intensity conflict nutrition activities should be 
coupled with FFA interventions that strengthen dialogue across groups and help defusing tensions.  
In highly fragile and conflict setting, nutrition activities focus on addressing immediate needs of the 
population via food assistance activities. Nonetheless, in presence of localised and low intensity conflicts, 
such as farmers – herders’ conflicts, WFP also helps increasing the dialogue across groups in the community, 
via the community-based planning and FFA interventions aiming to build social cohesion. These activities 
ensure that both farmers and herders have access to productive assets and can reach their essential needs 
in terms of food and nutrition security. An example of this approach can be found in Chad, where WFP 
supported the creation of fencing to protect crops from animals and producing a diverse set of crops, 
increasing climate resilience, among other activities. In the targeted communities, nutrition has improved 
significantly especially for young people.   
3. In areas most exposed and vulnerable to extreme climate conditions, nutrition activities should be 
coupled with those FFA activities that aim to strengthen resilience capacities (e.g. landscape 




In harshest climatic condition, as in the case of some parts of the Sahel, WFP implements integrated 
programmes which combines asset creation to food assistance and school meals. FFA activities, such as 
landscape restoration, adoption of climate smart practices, nutrition sensitive agricultural production and 
technical assistance are carried out to ensure that agricultural activities become resilient to climate impacts 
and that at the same time households can meet their nutrition needs.  On the other hand, home-grown 
school feeding activities are more suitable in area less vulnerable to climate impacts.  
4. In areas with protracted conflict and high exposure to extreme climatic conditions, a diverse set of 
integrated WFP nutrition interventions should be carried out to improve the entire set of resilience 
capacities.  
Where protracted conflicts are present in addition to adverse climatic conditions, WFP also works to 
enhance peace and development and create an enabling environment to increase resilience to climate 
shocks and stressors of the targeted communities, including climate and political shocks. This includes 
activities:  
- To improve the capacity to absorb shocks and stressors, such as food assistance. 
- To adapt to the climate crisis, including linking nutrition activities to the FFA approach, making sure 
that households can grow their own crops, have access to right type of resources and information 
to understand climate impacts.  
- To transform behaviours and systems in light of the increasing climate impacts, including capacity 
building activities, working with government in strengthening preparedness, establishing early 
warning systems that are sensitive to nutritional needs.  
Small Agriculture Market Support (SAMS) programming  
Keeping value chains efficient and operational during times of high insecurities is critical to ensure long 
term stability and security in communities. The Technical briefing Note “Peace, Conflict and Food Systems, 
Value Chains, and Smallholder Farmer Access to Markets”, identifies four main pathways whereby SAMS 
operations can contribute to keeping peace and security, via enabling and keeping trust, strengthening 
relationships and contribute to a shared and equitable economic growth. To address climate security issues, 
SAMS programming must build on these pathways and enforce its commitment to a more integrated 
programming, which links with climate resilience, nutrition, agricultural productivity, and gender inequality. 
For this purpose, the following priorities have been identified to link SAMS interventions to climate security 
concerns: 
1. Ensure that SAMS interventions address climate security concerns across the entire value chain, via 
strengthening resilience capacities and mitigating the climate security nexus.   
There exists five main entry points to make SAMS value chains more sensitive to climate security issues. At 
buyers’ level, SAMS should support the purchase of drought resilient crops to mitigate the impact of climate 
on the production side. At aggregator level, activities should aim to improve storage practices and energy 
savings practices. At farmers’ level, support should be provided to enhance the diversification of crops, 
adoption of climate resilient crops, providing inputs and insurances services. At consumers level, focus 
should be on local value chains, implement Social Behaviour Change Communication and awareness raising 
activities. And, finally, at market and system level, WFP SAMS should strengthen infrastructure and 
establish trading platform and increase sensitiveness of policy and regulations to the climate security nexus. 
2. Tailor specific interventions to local risks that are exacerbated by climate insecurity. In areas of high 




chains, linking local small holder farmers and close buyers, retailers, and schools and building on 
traditional systems of collective work. 
When possible, value chain relationships should be kept within the same region.  Specific activities include 
cash-based transfers, increasing capacity in governance, post-harvest management, training. The focus on 
these activities should be to keep and strengthen social cohesion, trusts and relationships across value chain 
actors, different groups in the same community, refugees, and host communities. In fact, value chain 
activities, if fair transactions and contractual arrangements are set up, might even create incentives across 
groups to cooperate for the common economic growth despite social and cultural differences, and 
therefore reduce the likelihood of future tensions and conflicts. For SAMS to be successful in unstable and 
fragile contexts, it is critical to build on those traditional systems that relay on collective work. In Liberia, 
for example, linking the traditional value of kuus, communal actions to prepare fields, to the establishment 
of future purchase commitments allowed the rehabilitation of community relationships in the aftermath of 
the civil war that destroyed infrastructure and caused overgrown land.   
3. In areas with high climate variability and extremes it is crucial to provide training and capacity building 
activities to increase knowledge and adoption of climate resilience crops, facilitate access to markets 
and reduce the risk of grievances.  
An integrated programming, linking PRO-C activities, such as insurance, risk reduction and savings schemes, 
and SAMS activities would require the alignment of objectives that move beyond the production stage, 
possible via the support of climate smart agricultural practices and adoption of energy efficient practices 
that would ensure stable production and returns also during period of crisis.  
4. In areas of high gender inequality, SAMS activities should prioritise value chains where women play a 
significant role and support women’s leadership roles across these. 
Climate security concerns related to high gender inequality and nutrition insecurity can be addressed via a 
better integrated programming at different levels. To address gender inequality at farmers level, SAMS 
focuses on value chains where women play a significant role, provides training and equipment directly to 
women and increase their access to resources and decision making across the entire value chain. At 
aggregator level, SAMS should work to increase women’s representations in decision making process and 
at market level it supports the government and advocates for development of gender sensitive policies.  
5. In areas with high nutrition insecurities, SAMS should focus on shorter value chains while strengthening 
longer supply chains to increase local offer of highly nutritious food.  
To address issues related to nutrition security, SAMS should work with shorter value chains, linking 
producers to local schools and retailers. It should also strengthen longer supply chains for the process of 
fortification and other nutrition enhancing activities to increase availability of bio-fortified crops. 
Additionally, it carries our nutrition awareness activities, grants access to markets and supports the 
development and enforcement of fair contractual arrangements.  
School feeding programming  
School feeding (SF) interventions include a combination of school, health and nutrition approaches. A new 
corporate strategy was developed in 2020 building on the evidence that the most effective way to improve 
and sustain children’s health and wellbeing is to directly invest on the health and nutrition of the learner. 
School feeding activities can play a strong role in mitigating the climate security nexus. It has been long 




preventing enrolment in armed group and providing food security to whole households. School feeding 
interventions can also constitute an incentive to keep school open during crises as they might be the only 
source of food for vulnerable households. For the WFP SF agenda to become truly climate security sensitive, 
the following priorities have been identified: 
1. Strengthen the role of SF activities in community ownership and engagement to build trust across 
groups and, consequently reduce local tensions and grievances. 
A strong collaboration between WFP SF and the emergency transition team is needed to make SF activities 
more conflict sensitive.  Detailed conflict and power dynamics analysis are needed to not only understand 
active conflicts, tensions and root causes of those but also to provide a clear picture of how schools can 
contribute to peace and security in the community. The role of WFP and the choice of school feeding 
interventions depends on a set of indicators that identify the level of economic and human capital of the 
country, the level of instability, intensity and type of conflicts presents in the country. In active conflict 
settings, for instance Chad, Niger, Mali or Nigeria, WFP has an active operational, emergency, humanitarian 
role, helping the governments in delivering emergency interventions. The type of school feeding 
interventions in these settings will depend on the type of conflict and emergency.  A good example of 
innovative school feeding activities in emergencies is the creation of “mobile schools” by the government 
of Niger, that are specifically designed to help keeping children in school during periods of emergency 
induced displacements. Others include making arrangement for sending children to schools located in 
neighbouring areas where tensions and conflicts are not that high. More insights on how to best carry out 
school feeding interventions in emergencies will be provided by the upcoming evaluation of WFP school 
feeding programming in DRC, Syria, Niger and Lebanon.  
2. To increase resilience to climate insecurity, SF should work with SAMS and FFA teams and ensure that 
school source from local producers, that land and water insecurities are addressed and that households 
have access to nutritious food, also and especially during period of crisis.  
In areas most exposed to climate extremes and variability, SF should strengthen its linkages with those 
interventions that aim to increase resilience to climatic shocks in the medium term. This would mean linking 
school food provision from local producers and suppliers as well as investing in reducing land degradation, 
improve watershed management and support production of good quality and nutritious food crops. 
Therefore, building resilience to climate extremes and vulnerability would require the combination of 
SAMS, SF and FFA interventions.   
3. Advocate and support the adoption of Shock Responsive Social Protection policies that allocated and 
enforce school feeding interventions during period of crisis. 
A key entry point for SF interventions to effectively respond to climate security concerns is the adoption by 
national government of the “Shock Responsive Social Protection” policies. The COVID19 pandemic has 
demonstrated that countries are able to flexibly expand and allocate safety net schemes due to 
emergencies. School Feeding should become an active part of these policies. An example of this can be 
found in the Caribbean, and especially in Jamaica, Dominica, British Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas, where 
national cash transfer and/or voucher programmes were effectively leveraged to provide relief support 
during shocks (Barca et al. 2019). Linking these programmes with school feeding interventions will ensure 
that schools are kept open where possible and that children, households and local producers can increase 
their hazard resilience in the short to medium term.  




School feeding interventions can also help mitigating inequalities. Examples of these interventions are the 
take-home rations, which support food security and access to education for girls, and lean season 
interventions which support the most vulnerable and food insecure households during periods of crisis. For 
SF interventions to be truly sensitive to these concerns, ad hoc nutrition situation analysis should be 
complemented by detailed gender and conflict analysis.  
Emergency operation division programming  
EME programmatic response is often seasonal and mostly related to provide relief in the aftermath of 
climate disasters. The main role of EME is to ensure access to food assistance to the groups affected by 
disasters. Timing of these interventions is critical for these interventions and often reaching people in need 
is highly challenging. This is the case of countries where active conflicts are present. In some of these 
contexts, as for instance, in Syria, WFP EME is forced to adopt expensive practices, such as air drops to 
deliver food assistance. In areas of protracted crisis, for example those lasting for one month or more, EME 
supports WFP country offices in the distribution food, cash, and nutrition activities to prevent and treat 
acute malnutrition. In case of widespread displacement, EME also supports the provision of packages of 
these interventions via mobile phones, as in Burkina Faso. Although the focus of EME interventions is on 
saving lives, these activities can also play a significant role in mitigating climate security concerns during 
and before the insurgence of crisis. For this purpose, the following priorities have been identified to link 
EME interventions to climate security concerns: 
1. Enhance participatory design of climate sensitive interventions to respond to community needs of 
regular access to nutritious food and crops and production support in collaboration with FAO and 
UNDP.  
EME supports the collaboration with other UN and local agencies to ensure alignment and coherence of 
emergency interventions with long term programmes that aim to increase resilience capacity of local 
communities while ensure food and nutrition security. Working with communities, EME identifies the type 
of food and assistance (e.g. local procurement systems, storage capacity, improvement of yields) that 
communities need to be able to respond and adapt to the climate crisis.  
2. Strengthen the use EME assistance to enhance communication and interaction across groups in the 
communities and interventions and to provide incentive for the government for an equal access to 
benefits of all competing parties in the short and long run. 
For instance, in Tigray, where markets are not functioning, WFP EME interventions are critical to ensure 
access to nutritious food to for the entire population, defusing potential tensions related to food security 
issues. Moreover, in addressing Rohingya refugee crisis, EME was able to neutrality and impartiality and 
ensure to intervene in these areas, provide assistance to people in the short run and advocate for a more 
equal social protection schemes despite the local disputes. EME interventions should be more and more 
used to foster dialogue, build trust and defuse tensions across competing groups.  
3. Strengthen the use of early warning systems and analyses to mitigate the climate security nexus and 
prevent the need for humanitarian interventions. 
Oftentimes crises do not occur in a vacuum. Signs of tensions and conflicts are evident for months before 
they escalate in active conflicts and might be directly linked to climate events. This is the case for instance 
of Madagascar, where La Nina related events coupled with repeated seasonal production fails significantly 
contributed to generate grievances and exacerbated insecurities that then erupted in conflicts. Therefore, 




analyses (ADAM; Watch List) and a conflict forecasting tool (CAS) to help WFP HQ and country offices to 
inform humanitarian and emergency interventions in a timely fashion. CAS analyses are directly available 
to COs and Early Warning monthly analysis are shared with COs regularly. These analyses are then used by 
the COs to estimate the amount of people that would need assistance during the expected emergencies. 
Despite critical in the planning of humanitarian interventions, these analyses do not effectively mitigate the 
climate security nexus ahead of the insurgence of the crisis. Integrating these systems with evidence on 
how climate and other crisis can lead to emergencies via the exacerbation of existing risks and insecurities 
could contribute to reducing the need for relief and humanitarian interventions in the future.  
4. Ensure stable and strong presence in climate insecure countries of WFP operations to support national 
institutions and local communities in mitigating climate security concerns. 
Not all conflicts are of large scale and active. In many countries where WFP operates, there exists low 
intensity tensions and conflicts that could still significantly affect food and nutrition security. In these cases, 
the role of WFP EME is in enforcing the implementation of humanitarian principles, building on years of 
interactions and relationships between WFP overall and the local government. EME work throughout the 
year focus on building and increasing awareness and knowledge across local stakeholders and beneficiaries. 
This has, for instance, ensured access to Tigray with the support of both Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.  
5. Regularly monitor the insurgence on grievances and insecurities at community level to address root 
causes of insecurities.  
The complaint mechanisms are effective tools for EME to understand where local grievances are building 
and can be used to start the discussions on those with local governments. Active presence in the field is 
also important. In Tigray for example WFP EME has deployed two staff to improve WFP programming 
sensitivity to conflict via directly engaging with local communities in the region to understand their needs 
during periods of crisis. Finally, in Tanzania, using the findings of an impact analysis in refugee camps, EME 
has been able to advocate for the withdrawal of restrictions imposed by the government on the refugee 
population, which had a significant impact on the role of women in the communities. Strengthening the 
field presence and the real time monitoring of risks, grievances and tensions will be critical for changing 
and saving lives of people in climate insecure areas.  
Food For Assets programming  
Although FFA interventions are not suitable in areas with highly climate insecure areas, there exists some 
critical entry points that would ensure stability and sustainability needed for asset creation: 
1. Create a FFA enabling environment even in more insecure areas. 
In countries affected by active conflicts, such as Yemen, it is crucial to identify those more stable settings 
within which FFA can be implemented. In these areas as well as those countries affected by localised and 
moderate or limited intensity conflicts, such as the ones between farmers and herders, FFA interventions 
should aim to increase access to natural resources, such as water, including building and/or strengthening 
institutional arrangements that take into account transhumance movement and proper use and access to 
important assets for both farming and pastoralists neighbouring communities.  
2. Ensure an equal access to assets, such as land, and strengthen trust across to different groups in the 
community. 
In presence of refugees-hosts communities’ tensions, FFA could be working on strengthening and 




equally able to benefit from WFP interventions. An example is the case of Zimbabwe, where as a 
consequence of a land reform, entire communities where displaced across the country, increasing tensions 
and instabilities. WFP, in collaboration with a local NGO, worked to improve the relationship, trust and 
communication across displaced and resident communities, which in turn created the enabling 
environment for effective and sustainable FFA asset creation, with shared benefits and improved livelihood 
across all the communities, displaced and resident.  
3. Address access to essential resources in the aftermath of climate events, first, and then improve climate 
resilience capacities. 
In area highly exposed to climate variability and extremes, FFA interventions can contribute to easing 
immediate impacts of such climatic conditions and events. In this scenario, FFA activities would aim to, first, 
address water scarcity, via the construction, for example, of water storages, reduce desertification trends, 
by landscape restoration and other soil interventions to improve ground water recharge, decrease erosion, 
and overall increase water availability. Once these immediate needs are addressed, FFA could also work to 
improve local capacity in adopting and using climate smart agricultural practices. Among these practices, 
FFA focuses mostly on water availability and soil rehabilitation and not so much on climate resilient crops 
and crops’ related technologies. This is somehow beyond WFP’s scope.  
4. Strengthen collaboration between FFA and emergency response teams to ensure food and nutrition 
security in emergencies. 
To address the multitude of climate security concerns, an integrated programming, linking FFA with other 
WFP units will be needed. For example, in areas where there exist high nutrition insecurities, and following 
the three-pronged approach, FFA should collaborates with the humanitarian and emergency teams to 
improve immediate food security needs of the targeted population. This will ensure that FFA beneficiaries 
are healthy and able to contribute to FFA related activities and at the same time continue improving their 
food security. Other important complementary activities are those that improve energy access and access 
to alternative fuels. 
5. Explicitly address gender inequalities.  
Among other climate security concerns, such as gender inequality, FFA interventions should be 
implemented to achieve an equal distribution of benefits across women, men and other vulnerable groups. 
For instance, interventions aiming to reduce the time used particularly by women in accessing water should 
be prioritised in areas with higher gender inequality. It will also be important to work on social norms that 
constrain women’s diversity of livelihoods. For instance, in Zimbabwe, WFP interventions influenced the 
role of women and men in washing clothes, a chore traditionally carried out by women and now undertaken 
by both men and women in the community. Changing social norms related to traditional roles in the 
community is critical to increase climate security resilience among women and other most vulnerable 
groups. 
6. Strengthen climate smart practices and technologies in FFA interventions. 
WFP's Food for Assets interventions include a waste variety of practices and technologies that help adapt 
to and mitigate progressive climate change, while increasing agricultural productivity and income – or 
otherwise called Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA). However, FFA interventions often don’t systematically 
highlight and measures such benefits contributing to climate resilience. Increased awareness and 





Gender programming  
Our analysis shows that one important driver of the climate security nexus in Ethiopia is gender inequality, 
especially related to education. The role of women as agents of peace and rebuilders after conflicts has 
been widely recognized and the importance of including women in peace talks and reconstructions strongly 
recommended also by the UN Resolution 3025 (S/RES/1325) on Women, Peace and Security (The UN 
Security Council 2010). This resolution clearly argues that women are better in keeping peace in the 
communities, in building trust. WFP recognises that improving inequality and power relations in the 
community will increase the ability of women to improve their resilience capacities and to contribute to 
keeping peace and stability in the communities.  Therefore, reducing inequality could contribute to 
addressing both climate and security vulnerability.  
As of now, gender is not effectively mainstreamed in the WFP climate and conflict programming, despite 
some donor interest in the topic. To make WFP gender programming more climate security sensitive the 
following priorities should be pursued: 
1. Ensure that girls are kept in school also during emergencies to avoid child marriages and multiplier 
effects on food and nutrition securities, which are key drivers of further tensions and conflict. 
 There exists evidence that climate can increase inequality and that this in turn can increase food and 
nutrition insecurities, and lead to further tensions and conflicts, especially in emergency settings.  Women 
are particularly vulnerable during emergencies. Child/forced marriage increases significantly during 
conflicts and wars. Early marriage has a substantial multiplier effect on the nutrition of the children, 
reducing with every year of missed education by the mother. Therefore, WFP should ensure that girls 
continue going to school and are well nourished, for instance via combining Social Behaviour 
Communication Change interventions and school feeding. Moreover, in fragile and climate vulnerable 
areas, providing incentives to families and not only to women might help in reduce inequality. For instance, 
the take-home rations as part of the School Feeding WFP programme in Mozambique and Zambia have 
been found to increase women’s participation to education, even in times of difficulties.  
2. Tailor interventions to reduce inequalities and counteract existing social norms and foster women’s 
leadership roles to decrease tensions at community level. 
In certain occasions WFP activities, for example climate solutions, might not be able to reach women 
effectively as women do not have access to the right assets. For instance, insurance interventions might 
end up excluding women as they often do not own mobiles used for insurance transactions. Similarly, for 
climate information services it is essential that assets, such as radio, are accessible by women, men and 
most vulnerable groups equally. WFP should tailor its interventions to the needs of the women and define 
selection criteria for its activities accordingly. The Adaptation Fund project “Building adaptive capacity 
through food and nutrition security and peacebuilding actions in vulnerable Afro and indigenous 
communities in the Colombia-Ecuador border area (Colombia, Ecuador)” is one of the few examples where 
WFP has been able to address issues of climate, security, and gender effectively. In this project, for instance, 
after realising that women were not effectively involved in the community decision making process, despite 
being the most knowledgeable on how to respond to climatic crisis, WFP changed their operations 
drastically to increase women participation and voice.  
Another example of interventions that link climate security issues with gender is in Mauritania, where FFA 
activities have been carried out specifically targeting women with the main objective of both improving 
climate change resilience and creating a culture of peace in two communities. In Libya, WFP has 




women, who are now recognised as acting leaders in their communities, have increased livelihood 
opportunities and improved their education. Also in Nicaragua, WFP has provided a “degranadora” 
machine, that has reduced drastically the time that women used for maize processing, allowing them to 
produce outputs of higher quality and freed time for women to attend community meetings.  
Moreover, to effectively address inequality, WFP ought to become gender transformative, changing the 
power relations in communities and directly intervening on those social norms that for instance force 
women to eat last, do not allow them to own land and other important agricultural assets or to access 
training. WFP must promote interventions that improve the position of women and most vulnerable in the 
places of power in the community. WFP has worked on this on few occasions, supporting gathering of men, 
women and other people in the communities and giving women a leading role in certain activities.  
3. Always making sure that women are safe, healthy, and well nourished, first.  
It remains that essential needs of girls and women must be addressed first. Increasing their food, health 
and nutrition security and safety are a pre-requisite for women to become agents of positive change, re-
builders and peacekeeping actors in the community. Aside from food assistance, WFP also provides shelter 
to the victims of violence. Improving safety and overall wellbeing is critical for women to contribute to 
increasing climate resilience and the prospect of peace in the community. 
4. Ensure that a gender sensitive and transformative approach does not generate further tensions and 
conflicts in the community via a thorough integrated monitoring system. 
In certain contexts, targeting women might also generate tensions, conflicts withing communities and cause 
domestic violence. Therefore, a thorough monitoring of interventions that disproportionately target 






In this study, we investigate the climate-food security-conflict nexus in Ethiopia and the CADC (Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras). Both Ethiopia and the CADC are hotspots of high climate variabilities, 
high political insecurity, and conflicts and widespread food and nutrition insecurities across their 
populations. Therefore, the main research questions that this study aims to answer for the CADC countries:  
• Is climate exacerbating existing threats that could increase the risk of conflict in the CADC countries 
and in Ethiopia?  
• Are areas of high climate variability correlated to high socio-political insecurity in the CADC 
countries and in Ethiopia? 
• How can WFP programming become more climate security sensitive? 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:  
(1) Climate exacerbates existing household level risks and insecurities that can increase the likelihood and 
intensity of conflict. In other words, we find evidence that climate is a threat multiplier in Ethiopia and El 
Salvador23.  
(2) In addition to climate induced insecurities, there exist other important household level predictors of 
conflict, such as age, education, and gender of the head of the household, ethnicity, access to electricity 
and location in Ethiopia and El Salvador. 
(3) The climate security nexus – the way climate, socio-economic and political risks and insecurities are 
linked to each other – differs across countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Ethiopia) 
and conflict clusters.  
(4) There exist “climate insecurity hotspots” at sub-national level where high level of climate variability, 
conflict intensity and diversity co-occur with other existing socio-economic insecurities.  
Our main recommendations can be summarized as follows:  
1. To increase WFP programming sensitiveness to climate security concerns, a specific set of priority 
actions should be implemented across the entire spectrum of WFP operations for changing and 
saving lives. More specifically,  
 
a. Strengthening the adoption of shock responsiveness of national and international 
interventions and policies, that aim to softened social protection policies to cope with crisis in 
a timely fashion and use early warning systems and protocols to prevent crisis and not only to 
prepare for upcoming ones.  
b. Addressing the root causes of conflict while maintain neutrality, via separating humanitarian 
and development needs from the causes of conflicts, keeping the advocacy focus on human 
rights and provision of technical assistance and enhancing active participation of communities 
in the design of interventions. 
c. Adopting a truly integrated programming, which accounts for the complexity and 
interconnectedness of the climate security nexus and that accurately defines and assess risks 
and insecurities in fragile and non-fragile settings across multiple dimensions.  
 





d. Making women the agents of change, by tailoring interventions to reduce inequalities, 
counteracting existing social norms and fostering women’s leadership roles to decrease 
tensions at community level. 
 
2. Qualitative analysis (stakeholders’ interviews and focus group discussions) will be essential to 
validate the results of these analyses. More specifically,  
 
a. SIPRI field work could target the climate insecure hotspots that have been identified and 
explore how socio-economic risks and insecurities have recently been exacerbated by climate 
and how these then affected the insurgence of grievances and conflict at local level.  
b. It will be essential to engage with local communities to identify those, if any, traditional and 
non-traditional mitigating factors, and systems that could alter the climate security nexus 
identified in this analysis.  
c. And related to this, a map of on-going national and international interventions that are 
contributing to the climate security nexus at community level could be useful. 
 
3. Any further quantitative analysis in assessing WFP sensitivity to climate security would require a 
substantial improvement in WFP data on operations. More specifically,  
a. The accessibility and interoperability of WFP intervention data is very limited, partly because 
it is being collected using different standards and stored in different formats without the use 
of ontologies or metadata. SCOPE data are not representative of WFP’s operations at country 
level. Nonetheless, it is the only source of information that we were able to access with 
detailed information on the specific location of WFP interventions. We thus suggest that 
project / WFP intervention data be made FAIR (Findable Accessible Interoperable and 
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